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CHAPTER 1 THE POLITICS OF FOOD SECURITY
Introduction
This

dissertation

examines

the

empirical

relationship

between

democracy,

decentralization, federalism, and food security across countries and over time. This dissertation
employs the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) (M. D. Jones et al. 2016; Kingdon 1984; Zahariadis
2007)

from the field of public policy as a basis to hypothesize about how democracy,

decentralization, and federalism affect the specific policy outcome of food security, and then
tests these hypotheses using a newly compiled dataset of all countries from 1990 to 2011. What
makes governments pay attention to food insecurity? To what extent does democracy affect food
security? Do formal federations have more food security than unitary systems? To what extent
does decentralization affect food security? Do different types of decentralization (fiscal,
administrative, or political) affect food security? The answers to these questions will contribute
to the literature on democracy, decentralization, federalism, and social welfare.
The relationship between democracy and social welfare is the subject of an active debate
that measures and operationalizes these concepts in several different ways. Scholars have sought
to measure and test democracy’s effect on social spending (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005;
Brown and Hunter 1999, 2004; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Stasavage 2005), and on
social welfare outcomes (Lake and Baum 2001) including poverty rates (Pribble, Huber, and
Stephens 2009), school fees and attendance (Harding and Stasavage 2014), and infant mortality
(Ross 2006). Most of this literature has a regional focus; some scholars study exclusively Latin
America (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Brown and Hunter 1999, 2004; Kaufman and SeguraUbiergo 2001; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009) or Africa (Harding and Stasavage 2014;
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Stasavage 2005). The most consistent finding from these regional studies is that democracies
spend more on social programs than authoritarian systems. Studies with a global scope are less
common (Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Lake and Baum 2001; Ross 2006). Only one study has
examined democracy’s effect on a direct indicator of food security: per capita calorie availability
(Blaydes and Kayser 2011). Whether the increased social spending in democracies translates to
better social outcomes among those who need it most is, therefore, not a settled question.
Food security is a basic human need; it exists when all people have enough nutritious food
for an active and healthy life. Despite being fundamental to all human life, and therefore to any
definition of social welfare, food security remains understudied in the political science literature
on politics and social welfare. This project uses food security as a measure of social welfare, and
studies it quantitatively on a newly assembled dataset of secondary data with a global scope.
To date, no studies have specifically addressed federalism’s or, more generally,
decentralization’s effect on food security. Not only does this dissertation address this gap in the
literature, but also it contributes to a methodologically diverse literature that examines
federalism and social policy (Pierson 1995; Rodden 2010). It builds on prior work that has
operationalized and constructed measurements of three dimensions of decentralization – fiscal,
administrative, and political (Schneider 2003a) – by employing these measures as independent
variables. The dataset also incorporates recent data from the International Monetary Fund
Government Finance Statistics Database to directly measure the dimensions of decentralization,
providing several different ways to test the relationship between food security and
decentralization.
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Scholars have examined the relationship between decentralization and pro-poor policy
outcomes broadly defined (Jütting et al. 2005; Schneider 2003b; Von Braun and Grote 2000),
poverty reduction (Ali Khan 2013; Crawford 2008; Crook 2003; Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Vedeld
2003), education outcomes (Faguet and Sánchez 2008), health outcomes (Uchimara and Jütting
2009), and responsiveness to local needs (Faguet 2004). While this literature uses a common
theoretical frame – that decentralization is expected to be more efficient and more effective than
centralization (Jütting et al. 2005) – single or small-N comparative case studies are most often
employed. This dissertation will examine decentralization using a large-N comparative dataset,
and it will apply existing theory on decentralization to a new policy problem: food security.
How and whether political institutions and arrangements affect social welfare is a
perennial question in political science. As more and more countries transition to democracy, the
relationship between democracy and social welfare has been a focus of attention.
Decentralization too has been an active topic in recent years, especially as it has evolved in
developing countries. While the case for decentralization may be strong theoretically, there is
some question about how well it works in practice. Finally, food security itself is a fundamental
human need and it underpins health, productivity and welfare. This dissertation bridges several
literatures and brings the focus squarely onto the question of whether these political
determinants – democracy, federalism, and decentralization – affect food security.
The Multiple Streams Approach
This project uses the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) (M. D. Jones et al. 2016; Kingdon
1984; Zahariadis 2007) from the field of public policy as a way to organize arguments and talk
about politics and policy problems. First proposed by Kingdon (1984), the MSA has been widely

4

used and applied in many settings across the world (M. D. Jones et al. 2016). The MSA models
policymaking at the system level, and conceives of political systems as composed of three
streams: problems, policies, and politics. The problem, policy, and politics streams flow through
the political system independently of one another. At critical moments, policy windows open and
provide the opportunity for changes in policy. When a policy window opens, a policy
entrepreneur (essentially, a power broker) can couple the three streams together – a specific
policy, addressing a particular problem, at a fortuitous moment in politics – and policy change
can occur – a new policy is placed on the decisional agenda, or a new policy is adopted. The MSA
is a useful tool to talk about how politics affects problem definition and policy choice at the
system level.
Problems are social conditions that exist in a society, but not all social conditions are
problems. They become problems when some person or interest group that cares about them
becomes powerful enough to define them as something that ought to be addressed by
government action. The problem stream is commonly operationalized by indicators, which are
statistics or other measurements that describe the seriousness, scope, or magnitude of a given
problem. These indicators form a steady flow of information, and sometimes changes or trends
in certain indicators, or simply the introduction of new indicators measuring an existing problem,
can precipitate policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). Policies are solutions. They may
arise in the policy stream in response to specific problems, but they are not always generated
secondary to problems. Policies often exist independently of problems that they could address,
and their champions will actively seek new problem areas that can justify the adoption of their
preferred policies (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). Policies sink or swim based on several criteria,
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including value acceptability (whether the policy conforms to prevailing values within the political
system), technical feasibility, and adequacy of resources (M. D. Jones et al. 2016, 16). Politics
comprises the ideological composition of a given government, the national mood, and the
relative power of interests and the pressure they can bring to bear. The politics stream provides
the theoretical framework for the empirical tests presented in this project. Bringing new players
into the system, as democracy does by empowering previously disempowered groups, changes
the power balance and therefore opens the possibility of defining social conditions like food
security as political problems, and adopting new policies to address those problems.
Democracy and Food Security
Democracy is, at its most essential, a political system in which power is transferred
through regular elections. Democracy also encompasses concepts such as political rights, civil
liberties, and the rule of law. This project takes a broad view of democracy that includes these
features of a democratic polity. Democracies and non-democracies differ from one another in
politics, problems, and policies. In each difference, democracies are more likely than nondemocracies to pay attention to food security, to treat it as a political problem, and to take action
to address food insecurity (Dreze and Sen 1991; Sen 1982, 1983, 1996).
Politics in democracies and non-democracies differ along the dimensions of
representation, accountability, responsiveness, participation, and mobilization. Democracies
differ from non-democracies in their degree of representation. Public officials in democracies are
accountable to their constituents through regular elections. Because politicians are accountable
to their constituents, they should be more responsive to the needs of their constituents in
democracies than in non-democracies. Broader segments of society participate in political
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decisions in democracies versus non-democracies. People participate in political decisions in
democracies through either voting or through mobilization that puts pressure on public officials.
Why does this matter for food security? In non-democracies, politicians need only respect the
preferences of the societal coalition that keeps them in power, and that coalition may be
exceedingly small and is often solely comprised of elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002). Food
insecurity is largely a problem of those living on the lower economic rungs of any societal ladder.
In non-democratic countries, it is precisely these people who usually lack a political voice.
In developing countries, large proportions of the population are food insecure (FAO, IFAD,
and WFP 2015). Under democracy, numbers translate to political power. Food insecure people
are afforded the means to make the government address food security, and are able to punish
those public officials who ignore the issue. Since, in developing countries, the number of people
suffering from food insecurity is substantial, food insecurity is precisely the type of problem that
would enter the decisional agenda in a democracy and be ignored in a non-democracy.
The differences between democracies and non-democracies in the politics stream in turn
affect the problems stream. Because there is representation of broader segments of society in
democracies than in non-democracies, more conditions in society can come to be viewed as
political problems that ought to be addressed by public action. Food insecurity is just such a
condition. Historically, food insecurity was considered to be an unavoidable fact that
accompanied population growth (Malthus 1872) – as populations grew, food production would
not be able to keep up, inevitably leaving many unable to meet their basic nutritional needs. This
is the core of the argument that food availability is the causal factor in food insecurity. In the 20th
century, thinkers (de Castro 1952, 1972; Dreze and Sen 1991; Sen 1983) began to redefine food
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insecurity, showing that it is a product of the political choices that structure food distribution,
more related to the question of who has power and resources within a society than to the
amount of available food. This is core of the argument that food accessibility is the most
important causal consideration in food security. Of course, writings among scholars and thinkers
can provide a conceptual framework, and can cause people in society to view problems
differently, but they do not necessarily make it onto the political agenda. That step usually occurs
due to political pressure, which is more often possible in democracies than in non-democracies.
Democracies have more space for group formation in civil society than non-democracies,
often ensured through protections surrounding freedom of association. Pressure groups can
mobilize around issues that would be considered background conditions in the absence of such
mobilization. Given teeth through the mechanisms of accountability through representation,
such mobilization can define food insecurity as a political problem, bring it onto the public
agenda, and incentivize politicians to take political action to solve it. In non-democracies, food
insecurity can be ignored or remain defined as a condition rather than a problem unless the
underlying regime ideology tends to turn attention towards it, or unless some elite group
becomes a champion for the issue, thus causing politicians to pay attention (Varshney 2000).
While these mechanisms may intermittently cause non-democracies to provide food security,
the mechanisms in democracy make it more likely that politicians as a matter of basic political
survival will address food security as a political problem.
The policy stream on the issue of food insecurity is strongly influenced by the problem
definition adopted within a given country. For example, food insecurity has profound effects in
the first 1000 days of life, with early nutritional deficits manifesting themselves over an
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individual’s lifetime (The Lancet 2013). Many countries have defined the problem of food
insecurity in this manner, and have chosen to focus their efforts on maternal and child food
insecurity as a result (SUN 2015). Other countries have defined food insecurity as a problem that
results from lack of economic access to sufficient food because of poverty, pointing to economic
growth-centered solutions (Varshney 2000).
As I explore more fully in Chapter 2, food insecurity is a complex issue with many
manifestations and myriad causes. It is particularly prone to redefinition, which can point to
widely varying policy solutions. This may be more of an issue under democracy than nondemocracy. In democracies, a competing array of interests struggle to capture politicians’
attention. Since food insecurity is multi-causal, it may be an issue that many groups can latch
onto in order to push particularistic agendas. Most food insecurity policies have long time
horizons for the positive effects to be felt – that is, they require a certain amount of political
commitment over the long term. Politicians in democracies have famously short time horizons –
usually reaching to the next election – and so long-term policies that could be more effective may
be forsworn in favor of short-term projects that can be directly attributed to current politicians
(Harding and Stasavage 2014).
Hypotheses: Democracy and Food Security. The foregoing discussion illustrates that it is not
simply elections that make democracy qualitatively different – freedom of expression and
assembly, mobilization, participation, and representation all must play a role if democracy is to
change social welfare. This dissertation employs a concept of democracy that is readily measured
quantitatively using the Freedom House indexes of Civil Liberties and Political Rights, while
retaining as much as possible the meaningful depth that inheres in the concept.
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Democracy exists along two dimensions. Political rights comprise the first dimension. Are
there elections? Are they free and fair? Do parties compete freely? Is suffrage universal and
participation of all social groups allowed? Civil liberties comprise the second dimension. Are basic
rights protected? Is there freedom of expression, association, and assembly? Is the rule of law
respected? These two aspects of democracy both provide different avenues for democracy to
affect food security. Political rights provide the means to hold politicians accountable; open
participation assures that disadvantaged groups can freely choose those that represent their
interests (and punish those who do not). However, without the full complement of civil liberties,
those groups may not be able to articulate their interests in the first place, mobilize fully to
achieve their goals, or keep up political pressure between elections to ensure that
representatives remain attentive. Responsiveness – a major factor in the argument that
democracy will produce higher food security – is promoted by both increased political rights and
increased civil liberties. Therefore, I propose a pair of hypotheses to test the relationship
between democracy and food security:
H1: Countries with more political rights will have more food security.
H2: Countries with more civil liberties will have more food security.
By dividing the hypotheses along the two dimensions, I will be able to test the relative importance
of both civil liberties and political rights, rather than conflating the two (or dropping a dimension)
in a simplified concept of democracy.
Federalism and Decentralization: What is the Difference?
Governmental Structure. Governments project power over a given geographical space, and in so
doing, they must incorporate a (more or less) diverse population with a variety of needs and

10

preferences. To this end, there are three main types of governmental structure: federal, unitary,
and confederal. Federal systems of government comprise at least two levels of government –
national and subnational – that have constitutionally defined authority to govern their respective
territories (Burgess 2006; King 1982). Federal constitutions provide for the “distribution of
legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue sources…ensuring some areas of
genuine autonomy” (Watts 2016, 12). Federations have formal procedures to incorporate the
constituent subnational governments into decision-making at the national level, and the
constituent governments retain autonomy, to varying degrees, within their own jurisdictions
(Burgess 2006). The constitutional basis of federations is an important defining characteristic,
because it draws a bright line between federations and unitary systems – those in which only the
central government has the ultimate authority to govern. Both federations and unitary systems
may function in a decentralized manner (discussed below), but in federations, changes to the
structure of authority require subnational agreement and supermajority action, whereas in
unitary systems changes can be made through normal majoritarian processes and are entirely at
the discretion of the central government. Finally, confederal systems are like federal ones in that
they have at least two levels of empowered government, but the authority in confederations
ultimately resides in the subnational governments, which delegate powers to the national
government for specific purposes.
There are currently twenty-seven federal countries in the world.1 They are diverse aside
from their federal structure and the particular politics that entails. Some are continental in scope,

1

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany,
India, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Somalia, South
Sudan, Sudan, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Venezuela.
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like Australia, while others are tiny island nations, like Comoros. Some have many subnational
governments, like Russia, while others have only a few, like Belgium. Some are based in civil law
systems, like Austria, while others are based in common law systems, like the United States.
Some of them formed from unions of independent states, like Switzerland; others through
devolution from unitary regimes, like Nigeria; and still others from a combination of the two, like
Canada. All of them began in an effort to accommodate regional diversity, but that diversity may
have been historical or territorial, like it was in Mexico, or cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, or
a combination of these, like in India.
All federal countries have subnational governments, but those governments differ
substantially in the scope of their jurisdiction – that is, in what policies they may enact and what
powers they hold (Watts 2016, 15–17). The legislative power may reside at the national level
while the administrative powers are decentralized, as it is in Austria, or the subnational
governments may have both legislative and executive powers, as in the United States. If
legislative powers exist at the subnational level, policymaking authority may be exclusive to
different levels, concurrent between levels, shared among levels, or residual (that is, one level
may have all policymaking authority not explicitly assigned elsewhere). A few federations – Brazil,
India (as of 1992), South Africa, and Venezuela – have constitutionally defined jurisdictions for
local level governments as well (Watts 2016, 16).
Federal systems, however, have commonalities, and they stem from the constitutional
nature of the political structure. While the scope of jurisdiction of the constituent governments
varies widely, subnational governments have substantial autonomy within their jurisdictions
(Watts 2016, 17). This autonomy is protected in federations in a way that it is not in unitary
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systems. It cannot be altered easily – often requiring a constitutional amendment. This
entrenchment of the structure of power within federal systems stimulates, enables, and
empowers certain political groups within those systems to enshrine their preferences in
government policy. Often, redistribution is constrained in federal systems, both institutionally,
and by the particular politics that federalism engenders (discussed below).
Federalism, when viewed from the standpoint of structure, represents an
institutionalized form of decentralization. However, as with formal and informal institutions,
decentralization may exist de jure or de facto: a system that is greatly decentralized in its
structure – like a federal system – may be quite centralized in its function, and likewise a
structurally centralized government – like a unitary system – may be decentralized in function. In
order to discuss this phenomenon more meaningfully, I first turn to a discussion of
decentralization in political systems in general, and then relate decentralization to federalism
more specifically.
Decentralization. Whether a country is federal or unitary in a formal sense, political power in
practice exists along a spectrum of decentralization. Decentralization is the extent to which the
functions of power are distributed away from the national government to different levels of
government. If all power is held at the national level, a country is said to be centralized; a country
with all power held at the subnational levels would be decentralized.
Decentralization has three commonly cited dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and
political (Schneider 2003a; Von Braun and Grote 2000). These dimensions address three
questions about how power is distributed. Firstly, what level of government controls the
monetary resources within the system? How is fiscal impact distributed between levels? The
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answers to these questions place a country on a spectrum of fiscal decentralization. For example,
if funding flows at the national level’s discretion from the national to the subnational levels and
those levels lack the power to raise their own funds, the country would be fiscally centralized. If
the subnational levels are fiscally independent of the national level – for example, if they collect
their own taxes, or if the transfers from the central government are constitutionally mandated
and/or unconditional – the country would be fiscally decentralized. If the national government
does the bulk of expenditures, then the country would be fiscally centralized. If the subnational
governments are making more expenditures relative to the national government, that would be
more fiscally decentralized.
Secondly, what level of government decides what policies to pursue? Who implements
these policies? The answers to these questions place a country on a spectrum of administrative
decentralization. For example, if subnational levels of government can adopt and implement
policy independent of national government influence or control, the country would be
administratively decentralized. If bureaucrats at the subnational levels are employed by the
national government and implementing national level policies, then the country would be
administratively centralized. The more autonomy the subnational governments have from
national control, the more administratively decentralized a country would be.
Thirdly, at what level of government does representation occur? Where does political
authority lie? The answers to these questions place a country on a spectrum of political
decentralization. As a structural matter, if a country had elections at the national, state or
provincial, and municipal levels, it would be politically decentralized; a politically centralized
country would only have elections at the national level. However, political decentralization is a
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functional matter as well. If subnational elected representatives are largely ceremonial, having
little power within their jurisdictions, or if subnational elected officials are simply stand-ins for
national authorities, then even a country with subnational elections at multiple levels may be
politically centralized.
These three dimensions range from total decentralization to total centralization.
Countries often function at a point somewhere midway between the two extremes, however.
For example, a country may have subnational governments that are responsible for
implementing some policies with the national government responsible for others. That country
would fall part way along the spectrum towards administratively decentralized. In another
country, subnational governments may be able to collect certain taxes or fees and control those
resources while the national government collects its own taxes and does not share that revenue.
That would be a case of partial fiscal decentralization.
Decentralization in Federal and Unitary Systems. When decentralization is treated as a
description of how a governmental system functions, it becomes clear that both federal and
unitary countries (and confederations for that matter) may display different degrees of
decentralization. Federal systems have institutionalized decentralization of authority, often
explicitly defined in their constitutions, but many of them function in a more centralized manner
than would be expected from the underlying structure. Likewise, many unitary systems function
in a decentralized manner defined by their policy choices.
Fiscal decentralization varies from country to country based on the extent to which
subnational governments have access to and control over their own revenues, whether or not
they have taxing powers, the scope and magnitude of expenditures that they make relative to
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the national government, the extent of dependency on transfers from the national government,
and whether those transfers are conditional or not (Watts 2016, 17). Federal countries differ
greatly from one another on the degree of fiscal decentralization that they empirically display;
likewise, unitary countries vary along this dimension as well. To use one measurement of fiscal
decentralization (Dziobek, Gutierrez Mangas, and Kufa 2011) as an example, the revenue raised
by subnational governments as a percentage of total revenue ranges widely among federations
and unitary systems, as shown in Table 1.1. I have chosen to present data from 1996 given that
one of my decentralization models uses data from that year, but any year that was chosen would
display a broad range similarly to this one.
Table 1.1. Subnational Revenue (% of Total Revenue) in 1996 for Selected Countries
Federal Countries
Unitary Countries
Subnational Revenue
Subnational Revenue
Country
(%)
Country
(%)
Malaysia
16.70
Chile
7.49
Mexico
30.86
Thailand
8.96
Austria
36.30
France
19.50
Belgium
40.34
Peru
23.61
Switzerland
63.15
Bolivia
38.65
Canada
71.06
Denmark
57.13
Source: calculated by the author using data compiled from IMF Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook (International Monetary Fund 2014)

Subnational expenditure as a percent of total government expenditure is another measure of
fiscal decentralization, and this too varies among federal and unitary countries, as shown in Table
1.2.
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Table 1.2. Subnational Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure) in 1996 for Selected Countries
Federal Countries
Unitary Countries
Subnational
Subnational
Country
Expenditure (%)
Country
Expenditure (%)
Malaysia
16.52
Thailand
9.61
Austria
33.52
France
18.22
Belgium
38.15
Peru
27.53
USA
47.56
Sweden
38.73
Canada
67.76
Denmark
55.81
Source: calculated by the author using data compiled from IMF Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook (International Monetary Fund 2014)

Subnational revenue and subnational expenditure as percentages of their respective
totals vary between unitary and federal countries, as well. A two-sample t-test for the difference
in mean subnational revenue percentages in 1996 (null hypothesis: no difference between the
means) showed a significant difference (two-tailed p = .002127 < .05; 95% confidence interval for
the difference: [15.07%, 24.31%]) with federal countries having a higher mean subnational
revenue percentage. A two-sample t-test for the difference in mean subnational expenditure
percentage (null hypothesis: no difference between the means) shows a significant difference
(two-tailed p = .009396 < .05; 95% confidence interval for the difference: [14.54%, 23.17%])
between federal and unitary countries in 1996, with federal countries having a higher mean
subnational expenditure percentage on average. While federal countries are higher on both
these measures than unitary countries on average, there is still a substantial range – more than
50 percentage points in all cases – within each category, showing that there is a difference both
between and among federal and unitary systems on the dimension of fiscal decentralization.
Administrative decentralization is commonly conceptualized as comprising three steps
that proceed from least to most decentralized: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution
(Schneider 2003a). Deconcentration occurs when a national government establishes
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geographically dispersed field offices that are responsible for implementing particular policies.
Delegation occurs when a national government assigns implementation responsibility either to
subnational governments or to outside agencies, who remain accountable to the national
government for the results. Devolution occurs when national governments confer total
responsibility and power over a policy to subnational governments. This dissertation views these
three steps as a continuum from most centralized to most decentralized on the administrative
dimension. All three steps may be taken regardless of whether a country is federal or unitary.
Federal countries are more likely to have many of these choice made a priori in their
constitutions, whereas unitary countries are more flexible in the choice to deconcentrate,
delegate, or devolve power to subnational governments.
Federal countries are distinct from unitary countries in the degree of autonomy that
subnational governments enjoy within their policy jurisdictions. In other words, while unitary
countries may be substantially decentralized on the administrative dimension, and some federal
countries may have a smaller scope of subnational policy responsibilities than their unitary
counterparts, federations in particular “leave their constituent units with greater autonomy in
the exercise of their responsibilities” (Watts 2016, 17). Watts assesses the autonomy of
subnational governments within federations when it comes to expenditures (i.e. who decides
how the money is spent at the subnational level) (Watts 2008). Figure 1.1 summarizes his
assessment.
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Figure 1.1. Autonomy Exercised by Subnational Governments Regarding Expenditures in Selected
Federations
Least Subnational Autonomy
Most Subnational Autonomy
Most Centralized
Most Decentralized
Argentina, Comoros,
Ethiopia, Malaysia,
Micronesia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan,
Russia, St. Kitts and
Nevis

Australia, Austria,
Brazil

India, United States,
Germany

Belgium, Canada,
Switzerland

Source: (Watts 2008, 2016)

Schneider (2003b, 2003a) employs percentage of subnational revenue that comes from
own-source taxes as a measure of administrative decentralization. This indicator captures the
extent to which subnational governments control resources that they can direct towards their
own policy priorities. While the indicator also captures something about fiscal decentralization,
it gives a measure of the autonomy of the subnational governments in terms of who decides how
resources are to be spent: the more revenue a subnational government collects from its ownsource taxes, the more policy autonomy it has. The percentage of subnational revenue that
comes from own-source taxes varies among federations and unitary countries, as shown in Figure
1.3.
Table 1.3. Percentage of Subnational Revenue Derived from Own-Source Taxes in 1996* for
Selected Countries
Federal Countries
Unitary Countries
Subnational
Subnational
Country
Expenditure (%)
Country
Expenditure (%)
Austria
11.14
South Africa
5.56
Belgium
16.10
Indonesia
20.11
Malaysia (2000*)
28.71
Bolivia
36.58
India
48.97
Mongolia
47.87
Canada
54.63
Thailand
55.03
Mexico
55.45
Chile
79.21
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Source: calculated by the author using data compiled from IMF Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook (International Monetary Fund 2014)

Subnational revenues derived from own-source taxes may vary between federal and
unitary systems, but there is no evidence that this was the case in 1996. A two-sample t-test for
the difference in mean percentage of subnational revenues derived from own-sources taxes (null
hypothesis: no difference between the means) showed no significant difference (two-tailed p =
.7797 > .05) between federal and unitary systems. However, this variable does show substantial
variation within system type, with a range of 44.32 percentage points in federal countries and a
range of 77.56 percentage points in unitary ones.
Politically decentralized countries have subnational representation. Functionally,
however, subnational governments exist on a spectrum of effective jurisdiction and power. Along
the political dimension, federal systems are clearly decentralized in structure – all federal systems
that are democratic have elected officials at the subnational level. However, many unitary
systems have local or subnational elections for specific offices as well. For example, France, which
has a unitary constitution, has elected regional assemblies as well as local elections for city
councils at the municipal level. Countries vary along the spectrum of political decentralization if
the elected officials at different levels are not empowered to make autonomous decisions within
their respective jurisdictions. In federal countries that have a single dominant political party, such
as Mexico during the rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), political power can
remain extremely centralized with all decisions flowing from the national government, even
when subnational officials are elected and ostensibly representing their local and regional
constituencies. Likewise, if party discipline is high, even without a single dominant party, officials
at the national government level may dominate decision-making at the lower levels of
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government. In this way, political decentralization as an empirical reality may contrast from
political decentralization as a structural feature of a governmental system.
Conclusion. The foregoing discussion supports my decision to treat decentralization and
federalism as two separate but related concepts in this dissertation. Decentralization will be
measured as a functional matter using factor scores that separate the concept along its three
dimensions. Federalism is treated as a dummy variable that scores a one for countries with
federal constitutions, and zero otherwise. By including these variables in my analyses, I can
measure and control for the effects of both federalism and decentralization, and by including
interactions where relevant, I can measure the effects of federalism and decentralization
combined.
Decentralization and Food Security
Decentralization is a policy choice, and an increasingly prevalent one in developing
countries (Jütting et al. 2005). This choice is made on the basis of strong theoretical arguments,
but solid empirical evidence of positive social outcomes is often inconsistent or lacking (Ali Khan
2013; Conyers 2007; Crawford 2008; Faguet 2004; Uchimara and Jütting 2009; Vedeld 2003; Von
Braun and Grote 2000). In theory, decentralization improves efficiency, in the sense of satisfying
the specific needs and preferences of the populace. Decentralization allows policies to be tailored
to both local problems, and to local policy preferences. If all policy is set at the national level, this
can lead to one-size-fits-all policies that may not effectively address problems as they manifest
in different parts of a country. Decentralization also theoretically improves governance. Bringing
the rulers closer to the ruled should increase accountability and stimulate participation when
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people feel a greater degree of external political efficacy – that is, when they feel their actions
have a real effect on political decision-making.
Decentralization should affect food security differentially along its three dimensions, and
the MSA framework helps to separate out the expected effects. Political and administrative
decentralization can be expected to have a positive effect on food security because of improved
problem definition (the problem stream), improved targeting of policies (the policy stream), and
greater opportunities for political pressure by affected groups (the politics stream). Political and
administrative decentralization allow for more finely-grained and nuanced problem definition.
Information about specific manifestations of food insecurity at the local level can be gathered,
assessed, and contextualized more easily by bureaucrats and politicians with specific local2 level
knowledge – and this type of knowledge is most likely to reside with local level officials. However,
information-gathering is often resource intensive, and can only happen if sufficient fiscal
resources are available and in the control of local officials. With good information can come
better targeting of policies to local needs. Under political and administrative decentralization,
policy choice and implementation are both local, and therefore policies can be tailored to the
specific circumstances faced by food insecure people. In one state, the problem causing food
insecurity may be drought, so irrigation policies may be the solution; whereas in another, the
problem may be unemployment, so works programs would be a better fit. Under
decentralization, this choice is possible.
Finally, there are several ways in which politics are likely to be affected by
decentralization. When local officials are empowered, they can become both a stimulus of and a

2

Local here can be taken to mean state/provincial or municipal – so, local as in not national.
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target for mobilization and political pressure among local groups. Likewise, people who may feel
that the national government would not heed their problems could be empowered to lobby local
officials to make their concerns felt. Given the lack of resources among most people suffering
from food insecurity, the lowered costs of participation and lobbying at the local level could make
it easier to find ways to bring political pressure to bear. With all of this, however, the underlying
assumption is that local governments have the resources they need to address the problems of
their constituents, so fiscal decentralization is always a factor in how much decentralized
governments can actually accomplish.
Hypotheses: Fiscal, Administrative, and Political Decentralization. The foregoing discussion
suggests three hypotheses, one for each dimension of decentralization:
H1: Countries that are fiscally decentralized will have more food security.
H2: Countries that are administratively decentralized will have more food security.
H3: Countries that are politically decentralized will have more food security.
Separating decentralization into these three dimensions and testing each one will allow a more
nuanced understanding of how decentralization affects food security.
Federalism and Food Security
Federalism is a formal government structure in which political power is shared between
a government at the national level and sub-national units of governments at one or more levels.
Formal federations are constitutionally defined. Federalism is often an impediment with respect
to social welfare policy (Pierson 1995; Rodden 2010), partly because policymaking is a great deal
more complicated under federalism, and partly because federalism can, and in many cases does,
empower those who seek to constrain redistribution. In addition to answering the basic policy
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question of what should be done, federal systems must answer a second question: who (i.e. what
level of government) should do it? Empowered actors at all levels have an institutionalized say in
what policies are adopted, and how they are implemented. Federalism complicates policy
making, especially when it comes to redistributive policies like most of those that address food
security, because it empowers subnational actors to an extent that wealthier regions of a country
can block or avoid redistribution of their wealth to poorer regions. The proliferation of policymaking venues under federalism provide more opportunities for opponents to stymie policies
with which they disagree by venue shopping, and policy implementation is more complicated
under federalism (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Schattschneider 1975).
Hypothesis: Food Security and Federalism. The foregoing discussion suggests that formal
federalism may impede efforts to address food insecurity. Therefore, I propose the following
hypothesis:
H4: Federations will have less food security.
I now turn to a discussion of the data on which these hypotheses will be tested.
Data Sources and Methods
This dissertation uses quantitative methods to investigate the empirical relationships
between the variables of interest: federalism; fiscal, administrative, and political
decentralization; democracy; and, food insecurity. For this purpose, I have assembled a timeseries, cross-sectional dataset of all countries from 1990 to 2011. Each model presented in this
dissertation draws on different subset of this dataset – none of them use the entire dataset,
principally because the dependent variable is measured less frequently than many of the other
variables it contains. All data are secondary – that is, I did not collect any primary data for this
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dataset. Instead, I combined information that had already been gathered and published. The data
are drawn from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance Statistics (GFS), Freedom House, the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and research published by Schneider
(Schneider 2003a) and Cafiero et al (Cafiero et al. 2016).
Democracy, federalism, and decentralization are the key independent variables.
Democracy is measured along two dimensions using the Freedom House scales of political rights
and civil liberties. Federalism is measured as a dummy variable that categorizes each country as
federal or not, in each year. Decentralization is measured along its three dimensions – fiscal,
administrative, and political – using factor scores developed by Schneider (2003a).
My dependent variable in all analyses is food security. Food security is measured using a
recoding of the Global Hunger Index (GHI), developed by Wiesmann (2002) and extended by
IFPRI. The GHI combines three dimensions of food insecurity – undernourishment in the general
population, child underweight, and child mortality – into one number, capturing some of the
complexity that characterizes the problem. The GHI is calculated so that it increases as the
indicators of hunger increase. However, this dissertation employs the concept of food security,
which is inversely related to hunger. Therefore, to eliminate confusion and facilitate discussion,
I recode the GHI into what will be called the Food Security Index (FSI). The FSI is the GHI
subtracted from 100, thus reversing the scale and creating an index that increases as food
security increases.
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The problem of missing data, which is considerable in these measures, is addressed using
multiple imputation (MI). Models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression,
and regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE).
Chapter Organization
Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation, establishes its contribution to the field, presents
the theory and hypotheses to be tested, and provides an overview of the data sources and
methods. Chapter 2 defines the central social welfare problem in this project: food insecurity. It
provides a current picture of the state of food security in the world, and discusses the
characteristics and consequences of food insecurity. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the
theoretical and empirical relationship between social welfare and democracy, decentralization,
and federalism, each in turn. Chapter 4 contains the empirical data analysis, presenting my
models and findings. Chapter 5 discusses my findings and how they reflect on the research
questions central to the dissertation. It also summarizes and contextualizes the foregoing
chapters, and suggests further research to be done.
Conclusion
Democracy, decentralization, and federalism all structure the balance of interests in
political systems. Both decentralization and democracy are often argued to enhance
accountability, and therefore responsiveness of government. But is this the case in practice?
What about federations? Are they better equipped to provide food security? This dissertation
will examine how democracy, decentralization, and federalism affect one specific social welfare
problem: food insecurity.

26

CHAPTER 2 FOOD INSECURITY: A GLOBAL PROBLEM
Introduction
Food insecurity is a daily reality for millions of people. For centuries, food insecurity and
hunger were not understood to be political problems; they were considered to be inherent in the
human condition. Malthus (1872) famously theorized in the 19th century that any species,
humans no exception, will increase its population until it outstrips the sources of nourishment,
triggering misery, famine, and death. This was presented as inevitable and inexorable. The
Malthusian definition indicated two possible strategies: population control, and increased food
production. However, in his formulation, the problem had no real solution; more food meant
more population, and a growing population would inevitably outgrow its source of food. In the
20th century, other theorists began to chip away at the subject of food insecurity.
De Castro (1972) wrote The Geopolitics of Hunger in 1952. He pointed out that hunger
was an ignored problem, discussion of which was almost taboo, and that its causes lay in the
failure of society to recognize and attack food insecurity as something other than an economic
and personal failure. Speaking in the context of the Brazilian experience, de Castro pointed out
that colonialism and the imposed system of agricultural production, land distribution, and land
use were major causes of food insecurity. Sen (1983) examined famines that occurred in India in
years when there was a surplus of food production, and found that hunger was caused by a failure
of accessibility: distribution of food, not its availability, was the central issue. Thinkers like these
began to sketch a different picture of food insecurity: not as an inevitability or a condition of life,
but a choice made by societies – a choice that could be unmade. The problem began to be
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recognized as a political problem, and food insecurity came to be defined as a failure of public
policy.
The market comprises the primary food distribution system of the world today, and many
analysts still view the market as the main solution to food insecurity (Leathers and Foster 2004).
However, for people facing chronic food insecurity, the market has failed. Poor consumers do not
have enough money to register demand for food – if they did, they would buy the food they need
– and so the market will not serve them. They rely mostly on their governments to fill the gap.
What causes some governments to adopt policies that fight food insecurity? What conditions
make governments pay attention to this problem? Under what circumstances are food security
policies more effective? What determines the success of public policies to alleviate food
insecurity? This dissertation examines food insecurity defined as a political problem with
solutions rooted in public policy. In order to do that, food security must be clearly defined and
measured. That is the goal of this chapter.
The Dimensions of Food Security
Food security is the state of all people, at all times, having access to enough safe and
nutritious food to lead a healthy and productive life (FAO 2009). Food security is a complex
concept. It consists of at minimum three dimensions: availability, access, and utilization. These
dimensions are ordered. Food cannot be accessible unless it is available. Likewise, food must be
both available and accessible before it can be utilized. However, none of the three is sufficient
for food security. Food security exists where the three dimensions converge: when enough food
is available, accessible, and utilized. Food insecurity is defined in the negative: it is the lack of
food security. Food insecurity exists when there is a failure along any of the three dimensions.
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Food security and insecurity occur at many different levels of analysis. For example, an individual
or a city can be food secure; likewise, a country or a region can be food insecure.
Food security begins with availability. Enough food is available when the food supply is
large enough and diverse enough to satisfy the energy and nutritional needs of every person in a
population. Is there enough food available? Is sufficient food being grown or imported? Is food
available in all geographic areas? Food insecurity is unavoidable when the available food is
insufficient to meet the needs of a person or a population of people.
Yet overall population-level food availability is not sufficient to resolve food insecurity.
Until Sen’s (1983) seminal work on famines, availability was thought to be the central problem
and food security was assumed to exist if the food supply was large enough to satisfy the caloric
needs of a population. Sen examined famines that occurred during times of plenty and concluded
that there was another crucial piece of the puzzle. He found that people starved when there was
food available because they could not gain access to the food. In so doing, Sen identified the
second dimension of food security: accessibility.
Accessibility is the degree to which people can gain control over the available food. Access
is itself a multidimensional concept. Access to food may be economic, physical, or social.
Economic access consists of the ability to exchange economic resources for food. Food may be
bought on the open market given sufficient funds; work may be exchanged directly for food; or
economic resources such as land and labor can be utilized to grow food. When the resources a
person or a population commands are insufficient to acquire enough food in enough quantity
and variety to maintain health, food insecurity is the result. Physical access is determined by
where food is located relative to people. The available food must be reasonably proximate, or
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transportation systems must be well-developed and distributed enough to move food
expeditiously to the people who need it. Food insecurity results when food is an unreasonable
(defined contextually) distance from the people who need it. Finally, access to food has a social
dimension. In order for food security to exist, people must be able to access it in socially
acceptable ways. Resorting to strategies like stealing or scavenging indicates food insecurity. The
social dimension of access also includes the idea of a socially acceptable diet; that is, a diet that
is appropriate in the cultural context. Resorting to foods that are not culturally acceptable is an
indication of food insecurity.
Is the food that is available accessible to everyone? If people are dependent on the wages
they earn, do they have enough income to buy sufficient food? If not, are there alternative
resources they can use to acquire food such as government programs for vouchers or direct food
distribution? If they are farmers, do they have the resources to grow enough food? Can people
get enough of a variety of foods or must they limit themselves to only a few, low-quality foods?
Can people get food in socially acceptable ways or do they have to resort to strategies that are
outside the norm? Is the food they can access part of a culturally acceptable diet? If the answer
to any of these questions is negative, then food accessibility is lacking. A failure of accessibility is
a dimension of food insecurity.
The third dimension of food security is utilization. Is the food that is available and
accessible being utilized properly? Utilization failures can fall into two categories: external and
internal. External utilization refers to the things external to the physical body that are necessary
to properly use food. Two major external factors important for utilization are clean water and
sanitation. If no clean water is available or if sanitation is lacking, it becomes difficult to handle
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food in a safe and sanitary manner. Another external failure of utilization is food spoilage and
waste. This can be a result of improper handling, or it can be due to lack of storage capability.
Internal utilization factors refer to how a person’s body processes food. A normally developed,
healthy body will process everything it needs from food, given an adequate diet. An unhealthy or
underdeveloped body, however, will often not be able to obtain the maximal benefit from food.
Disease can cause malabsorption of nutrients. This facet of food insecurity is examined in more
detail below. Figure 2.1 summarizes the foregoing discussion.
Figure 2.1. Food Security in Three Dimensions

Availability

Accessibility

Utilization

Food
Security

Food Insecurity: What Does It Mean for the Individual?
Technical definitions of food insecurity sometimes mask the fact that food insecurity is a
lived experience for millions of people every day. A great deal of work has been done to discover
the commonalities in experience of food insecurity; it is remarkably similar across cultural
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contexts (Ballard, Kepple, and Cafiero 2013). Food insecurity starts with concern and worry about
getting food or about running out of food, about not having enough resources to obtain sufficient
food. It intensifies as people begin to substitute lower quality foods and reduce the variety of
foods they eat because they lack the means to do otherwise. They may shift either to foods or to
ways of acquiring food that are less culturally acceptable, and these actions cause them to feel
shame. Next, people start to skip meals and limit portions to stretch their supply of food. Finally,
they go hungry, not eating for a day or more. While this dissertation relies on other more
traditional ways of measuring food security, increasing attention is turning to food insecurity
understood in this manner (cf. Ballard, Kepple, and Cafiero 2013; Cafiero et al. 2016; Coates et
al. 2006), measured by using surveys to gather information about the experiences and coping
strategies of people living under these circumstances.
Food Insecurity: The Physical Consequences
Food provides two main categories of resources to the body, both of which are essential
for health and life. The first resource provided by food is calories. Calories are a measure of
energy, and this energy is necessary to run all the processes of the body. Muscle contractions
such as heart beats, the physical process of digestion, nerve impulses, respiration, and physical
movement all require calories of energy to happen. The second category of resources provided
by food is nutrients. Nutrients are chemicals that make up the physical aspect of the body, or that
take part in bodily processes. Nutrients like protein provide the amino acids needed to construct
enzymes that enable body functions, as well as physical structures like cells, muscles and other
tissues of the body. Vitamins and minerals are chemical compounds that are necessary in
sufficient amounts for healthy body structures and proper bodily function. For example, the
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mineral iron is necessary for hemoglobin, a molecule in the blood that carries oxygen throughout
the body. Vitamin A is a vital component of the retina in the eye, enabling eyesight. All of the
necessary nutrients are available in food, and people can get everything they need from food
when they are food secure.
Food insecurity is the state of not having enough food, and further, not having enough
nutritious food. It may be due to failures of availability, access, utilization, or combinations
thereof. Chronic food insecurity manifests in the human body as two physical conditions:
undernourishment and undernutrition. Undernourishment is the lack of sufficient calories; that is,
a person suffering from undernourishment cannot access enough food to meet his or her daily
energy requirement. Undernutrition is the lack of sufficient nutrients; that is, a person suffering
from undernutrition is lacking a sufficient amount of one or more key nutrients, such as protein,
vitamin A, zinc, or other vitamins and minerals. Another way to say the same thing is that
undernourishment results from an insufficient quantity of food, whereas undernutrition results
from an insufficient quality of food (Waterlow 1997). The two conditions are distinct because
neither is necessary nor sufficient for the other. A person can have enough calories, but if the
diet is insufficiently varied then they may lack of one or more key nutrients to the point of lasting
harm. Likewise, a person may have a nutritious enough diet in that there is no specific nutrient
so lacking as to cause permanent harm, but may not be able to regularly consume enough
calories to maintain a healthy and productive life. Finally, the two can be concurrent in the same
individual. Figure 2.2 summarizes this discussion.
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Figure 2.2. Food Insecurity: Primary Physical Conditions

Undernourishment

Undernutrition

Undernourishment and undernutrition, separately or together, cause a host of
measurable effects. In children, undernourishment and undernutrition can cause stunting (low
height for age). Stunting in particular indicates chronically insufficient food for normal growth
(Waterlow 1972). In both children and adults, undernourishment leads to underweight (low
weight for age) and wasting (low weight for height). Wasting in particular indicates acute food
insecurity that has caused weight loss in the shorter term. A person can be underweight as a
result of either wasting or stunting, so this indicator captures food insecurity both in the shortand long-term (Black et al. 2008).
Undernutrition leads to a host of different diseases directly caused by vitamin and mineral
deficiencies. Undernutrition and undernourishment also increase susceptibility to infectious and
chronic illnesses and diseases. In turn, disease has a reciprocal effect on both undernutrition and
undernourishment. For example, diseases that cause acute diarrhea render individuals unable to
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properly absorb nutrients, exacerbating undernutrition. In adults, illness may lead to low
productivity or even a total inability to work. Even absent illness, chronic undernourishment leads
to low productivity due to weakness and lack of endurance. In both of these ways, food insecurity
compromises adults’ ability to work and thereby produce food or earn wages to buy food, which
in turn exacerbates food insecurity. Undernutrition and undernourishment in children leads to
cognitive effects that may last a lifetime. Finally, undernourishment and undernutrition can lead
to increased mortality, especially in children but, in acute cases, in adults as well. Figure 2.3
summarizes this discussion.
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Figure 2.3. Food Insecurity: Primary and Secondary Effects
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The literature about food security and food insecurity is rife with different descriptive
words and varieties of measurement (FIVIMS 2002; A. D. Jones et al. 2013). A number of concepts
occur regularly that appear to be synonyms for food insecurity, but important and sometimes
subtle nuances exist. Mixing concepts and using distinct words interchangeably can easily lead to
conceptual confusion. The word hunger appears frequently in discussions of food insecurity.
Hunger can mean (at minimum) two different things. One is a physical feeling that individuals get
when they have not eaten for a period of time. Hunger in this sense functions as the body’s signal
that it has a need for food. A second use of hunger is to refer to the situation I have defined as
food insecurity. This use of hunger can apply at the individual, national, regional, or global level.
Hunger is an evocative term, and one with an emotional impact, because it allows the reader to
directly relate to the topic at hand – readers of this research have certainly experienced hunger
in the first sense. Ironically, people who are chronically undernourished (i.e. hungry in the second
sense) often cease to feel the physical sensation of hunger, and those who suffer from
undernutrition will often experience no hunger (in the first sense) related to that condition.
Malnutrition is another word used frequently to refer to undernourishment and undernutrition,
but it has also come to encompass overnourishment, overweight, and obesity in the literature.
Primary malnutrition refers to undernourishment and undernutrition due to a lack of food;
secondary malnutrition refers to the malabsorption of nutrients that occurs due to disease. In
general, these terms will only be used in this project when referring to other works.
The Magnitude and Scope of the Problem
How many people are food insecure? The answer depends on what measurement is used.
Different measures capture different dimensions of food insecurity.

37

One of the most commonly cited measurements of food insecurity is the FAO’s prevalence
of undernourishment (PoU). This measure combines data on food supply and household
consumption to estimate the probability that a randomly drawn individual in a country will be
undernourished – i.e. unable to get enough food to meet their daily caloric requirement. This
probability can then be converted into a percentage or into a raw number of people. Thus, the
PoU attempts to capture both availability and access. The PoU estimates that in 2015, 795 million
people were undernourished (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2015). This amounts to just over one in nine
people worldwide. The geographical distribution of food insecurity as measured by the PoU is
shown in Figure 2.4. It is worth noting that the PoU uses a threshold of the minimum calories to
maintain a sedentary life – the minimum calorie requirements for an active life would be higher,
and using that threshold would define even more people as food insecure.
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Figure 2.4. Distribution of Undernourished People by Region (%), 2015

Southern Asia (35.4%)
Sub-Saharan Africa (27.7%)
Eastern Asia (18.3%)
South-Eastern Asia (7.6%)

Total Undernourished
= 795 million

Latin America (3.4%)
Western Asia (2.4%)
Developed Regions (1.8%)
Caribbean (0.9%)
Caucasus and Central Asia
(0.7%)
Northern Africa (0.5%)
Oceania (0.2%)

Source: FAO 2015
Note: These numbers are three-year average estimates of the prevalence of undernutrition (PoU) from 2014 to 2016.
The sum is 99% due to rounding errors.

Another way to directly measure food security – specifically the access dimension – is to
use survey questions. In the 1990s, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
developed an eighteen question survey module called the Household Food Security Survey
Module (HFSSM) that sought to measure both the presence and the severity of the experience
of food insecurity at the household level (Kennedy 2002). The survey questions inquire whether
households, given their level of money or resources, could acquire enough food, or if they had to
adopt strategies such as limiting types of food, eating less food, or going without food. The
answers to the questions allowed a household to be rated on a scale of four categories: food
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secure; mild food insecurity; moderate food insecurity; and severe food insecurity.3 International
attention has turned to this scale, and it has been adapted to and validated in many developing
country contexts (cf. Coates, Swindale, and Bilinsky 2007; Magaña-Lemus et al. 2016; MelgarQuinonez et al. 2006; Villagómez-Ornelas et al. 2014). Most recently, the FAO has instituted the
Voices of the Hungry (VoH) project that deployed a version of the scale called the Food Insecurity
Experience Scale4 (FIES) in the annual Gallup World Poll (GWP) starting in 2014 (Cafiero et al.
2016). The first deployment of the FIES covered 146 countries, and found that 1.01 billion people
over 15 years of age in those countries experienced moderate or severe food insecurity in the
previous 12 months. Of these, 375 million people experienced severe food insecurity.
By far the most plentiful measures of food insecurity are measures of utilization – how
well the food that is available and accessible is used by the bodies of the people eating it.
Utilization failures show up as both undernutrition and undernourishment. Undernutrition
causes deficiencies of important nutrients. As of 2013, more than 2 billion people suffered from
deficiencies in crucial micronutrients such as iodine, iron, vitamin A, and zinc, -- i.e. they lived

3

A food secure household does not report experiencing any food insecurity: it has access to sufficient food of the
quality and type that the inhabitants prefer. All of the food insecure categories are cumulative – e.g people who
are in households with severe food insecurity are also experiencing mild and moderate food insecurity. Inhabitants
of a household experiencing mild food insecurity (sometimes called food insecure without hunger) worry about
running out of food, sometimes do run out of food, and adopt strategies to stretch their food supply such as eating
a lower quality diet or a smaller variety of foods than they would if they were food secure. Adults living in
households with moderate food insecurity (sometimes called food insecure with moderate hunger) begin skipping
meals and reducing portions, and they may lose weight from undereating; children in these households are fed a
less balanced diet, and may not eat enough overall. Severe food insecurity (sometimes called food insecure with
severe hunger) brings smaller portions, chronically skipped meals, and entire days without food for both adults
and children.[(Kennedy 2002)]
4
The FIES module comprises eight questions that asked about food insecurity experiences over the past twelve
months (Cafiero et al. 2016, Table 2-1, 7). During the validation process, these questions were found to conform to
theoretical assumptions that they consistently measure escalating severity of food insecurity. Seven of the
questions asked about individual experiences, and the remaining one asked about the individual’s household.
Affirmative answers on four to seven questions scored as moderate food insecurity; affirmative answers on all
eight qualified as severe food insecurity.

40

with undernutrition -- due to a poor quality or insufficient diet (IFPRI 2014). Between 1995 and
2005, an average of 33 percent of children under five and 15 percent of pregnant women were
deficient in vitamin A as measured by blood tests (Black et al. 2013). Another way that vitamin A
deficiency is determined is by incidence of night blindness; 1 percent of children under five and
8 percent of pregnant women had night blindness on average in that time period. In 2011, 18
percent of children under five and 19 percent of pregnant women had iron deficiency anemia –
i.e. the type of anemia that can be corrected with adequate dietary iron or supplementation
(Black et al. 2013). In 2005, 17 percent of people globally were deficient in zinc, and iodine
deficiency stood at 29 percent of the global population in 2013 (Black et al. 2013). These statistics
reveal a widespread problem with food insecurity.
The World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, and the World Bank (2015) release
estimates each year of the number of children under the age of five suffering from the effects of
food insecurity, which are stunting, wasting, underweight, and mortality, each of which will be
defined below. These estimates are based on household surveys carried out in 150 countries and
territories and they allow inferences to be made about the entire population of 667 million
children under five in the world in 2014.
Stunting is defined as low height for age, and a child is considered stunted when he or she
is more than two standard deviations below the mean for the population to which the child
belongs. Stunting is the result of chronic food insecurity, and is often not remediable once it sets
in – at a certain age, height becomes permanent so limited early growth cannot be made up
indefinitely. In 2014, 159 million, or 23.8 percent, of children under five worldwide were stunted.
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Wasting is defined as low weight for height. Wasting occurs when a child faces acute food
insecurity – that is, an often short-term, drastic reduction in the amount of food. This happens
during famine, and also during other times of food shortfall that do not qualify as famine. A child
is classified as wasted if he or she is more than two standard deviations below the mean for the
reference population to which the child belongs, and severely wasted at more than three
standard deviations below the mean. Wasting is caused by acute and severe undernourishment,
but it is almost always remediable with feeding. In 2014, 50 million, or 7.5 percent, of children
under five were wasted, and of those, one-third were severely wasted, which amounts to 2.4
percent, or 16 million, of all children under five.
Underweight is defined as low weight for age. A child is classified as underweight if he or
she is more than two standard deviations below the mean for age and sex in the reference
population to which the child belongs. In 2011, the global proportion of children under five who
were underweight was 16 percent, or 101 million (Black et al. 2013). Underweight as a category
can encompass both children who are stunted and children who are wasted.
Mortality is the most extreme result of chronic food insecurity. Mortality is caused by
food insecurity directly and indirectly. The following mortality figures are for children under five
years of age in 2011 (Black et al. 2013). The number of children in that age group who died in
2011 was 6,934,000. Estimates of child mortality attributable to stunting range, depending on
the method of estimation, from 14.7 percent to 17 percent of total deaths in that age group,
which amounts to 1.02 million to 1.2 million children (Black et al. 2013). 14.4 percent to 17
percent (1 million to 1.2 million) of child deaths in 2011 were attributable to underweight.
Wasting (including severe wasting) caused 11.5 to 12.6 percent (800,000 to 875,000) of the
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mortality in children under five; 7.4 to 7.8 percent (516,000 to 540,000) was attributable to
severe wasting. Zinc deficiency accounted for 1.7 percent of mortality or 116,000 children, and
vitamin A deficiency led to 2.3 percent or 157,000 deaths of children under five in 2011. These
percentages cannot be added to get the total percentage of mortality attributable to nutrition
deficiencies because many conditions overlap in the same individuals. Still, it is estimated that
jointly, 44.7 to 45.4 percent of mortality of children under five in 2011 was attributable to
nutritional deficiencies (Black et al. 2013). Food insecurity causes mortality most often because
of increased susceptibility to and severity of disease. A study of 53 developing countries found
that 56 percent of deaths of children under five “were attributable to malnutrition’s5 [disease]
potentiating effects, and 83% of these were attributable to mild-to-moderate as opposed to
severe malnutrition” (Pelletier et al. 1995, 443). Depending on the country, the effect of
malnutrition ranged from 13 to 66 of child mortality, with a minimum of three-quarters of
mortality due to malnutrition ascribed to mild-to-moderate malnutrition, as opposed to severe.
Utilization measures capture the dire effects of food insecurity, but they are problematic
in that they also capture conditions that are caused by things other than food insecurity.
However, given the ease with which anthropometric measurements, especially on children, can
be gathered, these are sometimes the only measures available to assess food security. Over time
they reveal patterns, even though each individual measurement may reflect other factors as well.
Conclusion
This chapter defines food security conceptually along three dimensions: availability,
accessibility, and utilization. Food insecurity manifests in the individual as undernourishment

5

Pelletier et al. (1995) use underweight to measure malnutrition.
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(lack of calories) and undernutrition (lack of nutrients). Food insecurity affects the survival and
health of millions of people around the world. This chapter has sought to provide a conceptual
basis and a statistical picture of the scope of the problem.
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CHAPTER 3 POLITICS AND SOCIAL WELFARE: WHAT DO WE KNOW?
Introduction
Food security is of fundamental importance to social welfare. This dissertation examines
how democracy, federalism, and centralization are related to food security – specifically whether
they enhance food security at the national level in developing countries. The relationship
between both democracy, federalism, and decentralization to social welfare is an active area of
scholarship, although food security as a specific outcome has not been studied to any great
extent. This chapter presents a review of the literature. Firstly, this literature review examines
the relationship between democracy and social welfare as it has been framed, operationalized,
measured, and tested in the existing literature. Secondly, it turns to federalism and
decentralization and how they relate to social welfare outcomes.
Democracy and Social Welfare
A number of scholars have investigated the relationship between democracy and social
welfare. Social welfare comprises an extremely broad subject area; therefore, it has been
defined, measured, and operationalized in several different ways. In the study of democracy and
social welfare, a common approach has been to use social spending as a proxy for social welfare
(Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Brown and Hunter 1999; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001;
Stasavage 2005). Most studies that use this approach assume that increases in social spending
entail a positive effect on social welfare outcomes; papers that take this approach will be
discussed briefly. A few scholars have increased the scope of measurement to include social
service provision (Harding and Stasavage 2014; Lake and Baum 2001) or social welfare outcomes
directly measured (Lake and Baum 2001; Ross 2006); a subset of these have used outcome
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measures that relate to food insecurity (Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens
2009; Ross 2006).
Democracy itself has been operationalized in a variety of ways in the study of the
relationship between democracy and social welfare. The approaches include operationalizing
democracy as: a dummy variable for democracy and authoritarianism (Avelino, Brown, and
Hunter 2005; Brown and Hunter 1999); a dummy variable based on multiparty competition for
the executive (Stasavage 2005); a three-category range from authoritarian to democracy
(Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009); and a variety of recodes of the Polity III and Polity IV
autocracy-democracy scale (Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Lake
and Baum 2001; Ross 2006) often paired with robustness checks using the Freedom House
democracy measures (Lake and Baum 2001; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009). Summarizing
this literature and bringing it to bear on the current topic – democracy and food security – is a
challenge.
Democracy and Social Spending. In the literature on democracy and social welfare, social welfare
is often operationalized in terms of social spending. Some studies look at aggregate social
spending while others separate it into different types, such as social security, health, or education
spending. Most employ the implicit assumption that such spending leads to better social
outcomes, especially for the poor. Many of these studies are limited to a single region.
Latin America has been a frequent source of data to test the relationship between
democracy and social welfare. Brown and Hunter (1999) examined aggregate social spending on
health, education, and social security in 17 Latin American countries from 1980 to 1992 and found
that authoritarian countries were more responsive to economic factors and democracies were
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more responsive to political pressure and demographic changes; low-income democracies were
especially likely to spend more than their authoritarian counterparts. Authoritarian systems were
quicker to cut social spending in the face of economic downturns than democracies were.
Avelino, Brown, and Hunter (2005) studied 19 Latin American countries from 1980 to 1999 and
found that democracy was associated with increased social spending, particularly on human
capital formation in the face of globalization. Democracies were found to protect social programs
more than authoritarian countries, especially programs with large constituencies, but also those
with small but politically powerful constituencies. In contrast, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
(2001) examined 14 Latin American countries from 1973 to 1997 and found democracies no
different than authoritarian regimes in terms of aggregate social spending or responsiveness to
economic downturns. When social spending was disaggregated into social security spending and
spending on human capital (i.e. health and education), democracies were found to spend more
on human capital than both authoritarian and popularly based (those dependent on organized
labor or oriented towards the popular sector) regimes.
Stasavage (2005) examined democracy and education spending in 44 African countries
between 1980 and 1996. He theorized that with the onset of democracy, rural groups in these
countries would have more political power than they did under authoritarian regimes. Urban
groups would be similarly empowered no matter the regime type, since urban unrest is a
perennial peril to governments whether democratic or authoritarian. Rural groups prioritize
primary education over university level education, and urban groups favor university funding.
Therefore, Stasavage hypothesized that if it is true that democracies are more responsive to
newly empowered constituencies, then, as they become democratic, regimes should increase
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service provision (operationalized here as education spending) and distribute those service
increases accordingly. Stasavage found that countries with multiparty competition for the
executive (the operationalization of democracy employed in this study) had higher education
spending overall, and this was driven by increased spending on primary education while
university funding stayed constant, supporting the contention that democratic politicians will
tailor their actions to newly empowered groups.
These studies examined social spending as a proxy for social welfare. On balance,
democracy was found to have a positive effect on social spending in most cases. These studies
were limited to certain regions, and they do not provide evidence that increases in social
spending have had positive impacts on social welfare outcomes.
Democracy and Social Service Provision. The literature has several different foci when it comes
to democracy and social welfare. Some studies examined the relationship between democracy
and social service provision, which is a more proximate measure for social welfare than social
spending. Other studies look at social welfare outcomes directly. When outcomes are tested,
democracy’s effect becomes more complex.
An influential and oft-cited study by Lake and Baum (2001) examined nine social service
provision measures6 and eight social welfare outcomes and found that democracy has a generally
positive effect in comparison to authoritarian systems. This study employed 17 cross-sectional

6

Lake and Baum (2001) test 17 total measures. While their study employs all of them as measures of provision of
public services (Lake and Baum 2001, 600–602, Table 1), this dissertation makes a conceptual distinction between
social service provision and social welfare outcomes. Therefore, the literature review will consider the two
categories of measures separately. Social service provision is measured as: primary school pupil-teacher ratio;
health care access; clean water access: total, rural, and urban; population per physician; attended births; DPT and
measles immunizations. Social welfare outcomes are measured by: adult illiteracy; persistence in school to fourth
grade; primary, secondary, and tertiary school gross enrollment ratios; crude death rate; infant mortality rate; and
life expectancy at birth.
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analyses and five time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analyses using data from between 37 and 110
countries, depending on the measure in question, from the years 1970 to 1992. Among the
studies discussed in this literature review, this study is one of the few that includes both
developing and developed countries, although the authors indicate that the inclusion of highincome countries did not bias the results (Lake and Baum 2001, 603). While the magnitude varied
across indicators, in all but six of the 38 cross-sections, democracy had a strong and positive effect
(appropriately scaled by indicator – positive here represents an improvement) compared to
authoritarian systems. The five TSCS analyses examined democracy’s association with secondary
school enrollment ratio (yearly from 1975-1993), safe water access (every three years from 19851994), measles and DPT immunizations (every 3 years from 1986-1995 for both), and infant
mortality (every five years from 1967-1992), all measured in first differences – the change in level
from the prior time period to the current time period. In all cases democracy was strongly
associated with positive changes as compared with authoritarian regimes. The authors conclude
that democracy is associated with higher levels of public services worldwide.
Harding and Stasavage (2014) examine the question of democracy and social service
provision in 29 African countries between 1980 and 2007. They ask several related questions.
Does democracy lead to greater social service provision? If so, what types of social services can
democracy be expected to increase or improve? Finally, does democracy lead to better social
outcomes through higher service provision? Their argument rests on the time horizons and goals
of politicians within new democracies with weak state capacity. Under democracy, politicians will
seek to provide social services in order to fulfill campaign promises and to build electoral support.
However, in a context of weak state capacity, it is difficult for voters to attribute blame or credit
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for many types of policy actions, and so politicians will tend to implement changes and services
for which the credit is easily attributable. When it comes to education provision, such a politician,
faced with the choice to improve school inputs (by providing more teachers) or abolishing school
fees, will choose the directly attributable action of abolishing school fees. Abolishing school fees
is an example of social service provision that should result in higher attendance, but this raises
questions about the quality of the services provided. Indeed, Harding and Stasavage find that
under democracy, school attendance is higher and that this effect is due to the abolishing of
primary school fees. However, teacher-pupil ratios also are higher under democracy because
these less attributable inputs do not keep pace with the higher enrollments – so, while
democracy does provide more services, service quality is not necessarily enhanced. Finally,
Harding and Stasavage present survey evidence from Kenya that voters indeed make decisions
to support politicians based on campaign promises to abolish school fees.
Democracy and Social Welfare: A Complicated Picture. The Harding and Stasavage study brings
nuance to the debate about democracy and social welfare. Whereas previous studies expected
and tested the positive effect of democracy, this study points out that democracy may have a
positive effect on some outcome indicators, but that this may come at the expense of other
indicators. Rather than considering democracy as a monotonically positive influence on social
welfare, perhaps it is important to consider exactly how democracy works in practice, and how
the pragmatic politics that attend elections and re-elections might influence the choice of social
welfare options that democratic politicians are likely to support.
Harding and Stasavage were not the first to question whether democratic politics may
hinder the effectiveness of social welfare efforts. Varshney (2000) addressed this question by
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asking why long-standing democracies (defined as countries that had maintained democracy for
more than half the time since the late 1940s or since a particular country’s independence) have
not eliminated poverty. Poverty is conceptualized in terms of malnourishment, and defined as
the percent of the population living on less than $1 (PPP) per day – the amount needed to
maintain a minimum caloric intake for body functions (Varshney 2000, 724). Using a small-N
comparative design, Varshney compared 8 democracies to 15 authoritarian countries and found
that democracies have a moderate record on poverty alleviation (and no democratic country has
ignored the problem) while authoritarian countries run the range from best to worst. He argued
that in authoritarian countries, governments must satisfy the elite (who are not food-insecure)
but that these countries may attack poverty if there is an ideological reason to do so or if an elite
coalition forms behind poverty alleviation. In democracies, the government must serve the needs
of the electorate, which in developing countries will be disproportionately poor. This would lead
one to believe that democratic governments would vigorously attack poverty, but the fact that
poverty alleviation has been only moderate under long-term democracy shows that this is not
the case.
Varshney argues that the pattern of moderate poverty alleviation (but not elimination)
by democracies may be due to two different characteristics of democratic politics. First, he
differentiates between indirect and direct methods of poverty alleviation: indirect methods are
growth-mediated and include market-oriented reforms, currency devaluation, and liberalizing
trade; whereas direct methods include distribution of food, income, or assets to the poor
(Varshney 2000, 722–23). Democratic politicians with short time horizons extending little past
the next election, faced with an impoverished electorate, will opt for the direct methods rather
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than seek to build support for indirect policies that may pay off in the long run but will also cause
short term disruption. In fact, the reason Varshney posits for authoritarian poverty alleviation
success stories is precisely that in those countries, politicians had the ability to adopt and impose
unpopular policies because they were not accountable to any but the elite – who usually
benefited from such policies. The direct methods will alleviate the most severe forms of poverty,
but may not solve the larger structural issues that, if addressed, can lead to long-term and more
successful poverty alleviation. Second, Varshney points out that while people may be divided into
the poor and the well-off, the poor are not a monolithic group that will vote on economic selfinterest alone. The poor as a group are divided along ethnic, religious, and geographical lines to
name just a few, and they may vote along those lines instead of supporting anti-poverty
politicians as a voting bloc. Thus, the effect of the large numbers of impoverished voters may be
attenuated at the ballot box.
Both Varshney (2000) and Harding and Stasavage (2014) shed light on the complexity of
the links between democracy and social welfare. While the poor make up a large portion of the
electorate in most developing countries, it does not automatically follow that the interests of the
poor as an economic bloc will be addressed by democratic governments. In order for that to
happen, those interests must first be coherently expressed at the ballot box. Even in that case,
democratic politics may sometimes work against effective policy action. The politician who wants
to be re-elected may not be able to effectively advocate for optimal policies, and may instead
opt for more easily explained solutions or quick fixes that do not address the underlying issue in
the long run. For both these reasons, we may not always observe positive social welfare changes
in democracies when compared with authoritarian systems, or the picture may be mixed, albeit
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in predictable ways. As this discussion related to food insecurity, however, the short time
horizons of democratic politicians may work in favor of ameliorating food insecurity. Short-term
food and voucher provision programs can be very successful in providing food security, even if
they are not long-term fixes.
Democracy and Food Security. No project on food security and democracy can be complete
without making mention of Amartya Sen’s seminal and extensive work on democracy and famine
(Dreze and Sen 1991; Sen 1982, 1983, 1996). Sen found that historically, famines have often
occurred in years when food production was more than sufficient to cover nutritional needs. This
fact led him to the insight that food supply is only part of the equation in food security; an equally
important aspect is food distribution – what is now called food accessibility. Sen first defined
entitlements – the bundle of resources (both monetary and nonmonetary) that people can
exchange for food – and traced the cause of famine to entitlement failure. Different groups within
society have different levels of entitlements, which are the result of both market activity and, to
a large extent – especially for the most vulnerable – government policy. During normal times,
they can exchange these entitlements for enough food to live and thrive. Certain groups in
society are more vulnerable than others to entitlement failure, which may be caused by
environmental or economic disaster. Widespread entitlement failure causes famine.
Sen used comparative case studies to draw the conclusion that democracy protects
against famine (Sen 1983). Specifically, the existence of opposition parties and a free press under
democracy constitute a systematic source of political pressure on the regime in power, which
forces it to address famine conditions. Sen assumes that democracies will have freedom of the
press (showing how important it is to consider broader concerns than just elections when
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examining democracy and social outcomes) and that the press would bring information about
ongoing famine to public attention. Opposition parties likewise have an incentive to publicize
famine as a way to criticize the party or parties in power. Sen points out that the rulers never
starve in a famine, and argues that “(d)emocracy…would spread the penalty of famine to the
ruling groups and the political leadership” (Sen 1996, 24). This is a statement about the power of
focusing events, like severe famine, to shift attention within a political system. But what about
the case of chronic food insecurity?
Chronic food insecurity is not the same as famine. Chronic food insecurity has a more
complex set of causes, and therefore, problem definition is much less clear. Likewise, the
solutions to it are numerous. Whereas democracy may be protective against famine, it may not
be so automatically advantageous for other types of social problems: “Democracies have been
particularly successful in preventing disasters that are easy to understand, in which sympathy can
take an especially immediate form….While the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize, these
other deprivations call for a deeper analysis” (Sen 1996, 26). He argues this weakness of
democracy is particularly problematic when a problem disproportionately affects minority
groups within the society: the extent to which such a problem will be politicized will depend on
how sympathetic the minority group is in the eyes of the majority. Finally, Sen emphasizes that
political rights are central to the formulation of needs in the first place. If there are no political
rights, then some conditions will simply remain in the background, not defined as political
problems, but rather as personal failings or just natural inevitabilities.
If democracies are more responsive to food insecurity than non-democracies, this must
be in part because politicians in democracies feel electoral pressure to adopt policies to increase
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food security. It follows that the motivation to address food insecurity will be a function of
election cycles – when elections are imminent, politicians should be especially attuned to food
insecurity among potential voters. The Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index, a project that
investigates political commitment to hunger reduction and nutrition enhancement, provides
evidence that this may be true (te Lintelo et al. 2014; te Lintelo and Lakshman 2015). Expert
interviews were used to assess political commitment to food and nutrition security in six
countries: Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania, and Zambia. Experts were asked the
question: “How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition to
electoral cycles?” (te Lintelo et al. 2014, 105). In three of the six countries this electoral sensitivity
was characterized as strong or very strong, in one it was fairly strong, and in two it was
moderate.7 Strikingly, in five out of six countries, the expert panels judged government
expenditures on hunger to be more sensitive to electoral cycles than to emergencies and
disasters – in some cases dramatically so. This finding supports the proposition that elections
cause politicians to pay attention to food insecurity, while leaving open the question of whether
the attention is sustained or intermittent.
Turning back to the quantitative empirical literature, two recent studies have used food
security measures as the dependent variable in empirical tests of the relationship between
democracy and social welfare (Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009).
Pribble et al (2009) examine poverty in 18 Latin American countries from 1968 to 2001; their

7

The authors differentiate between hunger and undernutrition (te Lintelo et al. 2014, 9) and report expert responses
for both. Part of their project is an effort to determine whether political commitment is different along these
dimensions. I report their findings for what they term ‘hunger’ because it most closely aligns with the definition of
food insecurity used in this dissertation.
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poverty measure is based on the percentage of households that have enough resources
(monetary and nonmonetary) to satisfy their basic nutrition requirement (CEPAL/ECLAC 2002,
39, Box 1.1). Blaydes and Kayser (2011) study available calories per capita (which they term
calorie consumption). Both papers found that democracy had a positive effect on their respective
dependent variables, as compared with authoritarian systems.
Democracy and Social Welfare: The Missing Data Problem. An important paper by Ross (2006)
addressed two separate issues: first, it examined prior work on democracy and social welfare and
identified an important source of bias present in most studies; and second, it presented a new
analysis of democracy and its relationship to infant and child mortality. Infant mortality is strongly
related to food security – so much so that it is included in the Food Security Index that I will use
as my dependent variable in the next chapter. Democracies spend more on social welfare than
authoritarian systems, but it does not follow that social outcomes will be pro-poor. The
distribution of such spending is an important consideration, because if it accrues to those with
middle and upper incomes – in which case government spending would simply displace the
spending such groups would have the means to do anyway – then increased social spending will
not translate to better outcomes for all social strata. This is why it is important to broaden the
study of democracy and social welfare to include outcomes, rather than using proxy measures
that may not tell the whole story.
The second concern Ross raises is methodological – and devastating for prior studies that
purport to show empirical links between democracy and good social welfare outcomes. Most of
these studies use listwise deletion to deal with missing data.8 This practice is not a problem if the

8

For exceptions see Stasavage (2005) and Harding and Stasavage (2014).
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data are missing completely at random (MCAR) – in MCAR cases, the data that are missing have
no relationship with any variables in the dataset as a whole, and therefore no relationship with
the other variables in the model. The randomness of the MCAR missing data protects against
sample bias in the results. However, Ross analyzes datasets from prior studies and finds that the
data are not missing completely at random. In fact, there is a pattern to the missingness.
Democracies that are low-income tend to be the recipients of foreign aid and loans from
institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Aid from such institutions
comes with stipulations for data generation (to check on effectiveness of programs funded by
the aid) and with capacity building funds for data collection. Authoritarian countries are less likely
to get such aid and therefore less likely to produce data on social welfare outcomes. This adds
up to a devastating pattern of missingness in the resulting datasets – low-income democracies
have complete data and are therefore included in analyses, while high-performing authoritarian
countries are dropped because their data is incomplete (Ross 2006, 863). Regime type is the
explanatory variable in studies of democracy and social welfare, and the missingness in the data
is directly related to it. Ross presents empirical support for many of the steps in this argument.
Ross argues that the pattern of missingness leads to sample bias and skewed results.
Specifically, it makes the relationship between democracy and social welfare outcomes appear
much stronger and more positive than it actually is. Ross tests the effect of regime type on infant
and child mortality on a dataset of all 168 states with more than 200,000 population that were
sovereign from 1970 to 2000 (Ross 2006, 865). When testing for the effect on a dataset that used
listwise deletion to address missing data, democracy is a significant predictor of infant and child
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mortality. However, when Ross re-estimated the model after using multiple imputation to
mitigate the effect of the missingness, democracy was no longer significant.
Lessons from the Literature. Three lessons stand out from this review:
1) It is crucial to use measures for social welfare that capture the phenomenon in question
instead of proxies like social spending, even if the proxies are more easily measurable and
the data is more available. This project operationalizes social welfare as food security,
arguably the foundation on which all other types of social welfare are built. Instead of
measuring food security in terms of spending, calorie availability (Blaydes and Kayser
2011), or in terms of household or individual resources (Pribble, Huber, and Stephens
2009), food security will be measured using an index that captures more information
about the manifestation of food insecurity in each country by including a measure that
captures food supply (availability) to calculate percent undernourished as well as two
measurable outcomes that depend heavily on food security: child mortality under five
years of age and child underweight under five years of age (Wiesmann 2002). This index
incorporates measures of all dimensions of food insecurity, enhancing its content validity.
2) Many of the cited studies have a limited geographical scope. This limits the
generalizability of their findings. If democracy truly enhances food security, this should
be evident across both time and geographical space. Rather than test this relationship in
a particular region, my analysis includes all countries over 200,000 in population from
1990 to 2011.
3) It is vital to address the missing data problem before performing data analysis of
international datasets dealing with regime type in order to prevent sample bias.
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Therefore, I will use multiple imputation to impute the missing values and present results
on two datasets: one using listwise deletion and the other using multiple imputation.
In conclusion, this literature review shows that the question of democracy’s effect on social
welfare is still open. While it has been tested in a variety of contexts, methodological problems
raise questions as to the legitimacy of positive findings. My analysis will attempt to learn from
the experience of these other scholars and apply the lessons learned in a new context.
Decentralization and Social Welfare
Decentralization is an increasingly common policy prescription, especially in developing
countries (Ali Khan 2013; Von Braun and Grote 2000). The relationship between decentralization
and various social outcomes has been studied extensively using case studies (Crawford 2008;
Crook 2003; Jütting et al. 2005; Steiner 2007; Uchimara and Jütting 2009), and occasionally in
more quantitative designs within a case study context (Faguet 2004; Faguet and Sánchez 2008).
One challenge when surveying this literature is the sheer number of different ways
decentralization is defined and operationalized.
Almost all studies of decentralization share a common basis in dividing the concept along
three dimensions. Firstly, who controls public monetary resources? The answer to this question
places a country on a spectrum of fiscal decentralization. For example, if funding flows from the
national level to the subnational governmental units and the subunits lack the power to raise
their own funds, the country would be fiscally centralized; if the subunits are fiscally independent
of the national level, the country would be fiscally decentralized. Secondly, who decides what
policies to pursue and who implements these policies? The answer to this question places a
country on a spectrum of administrative decentralization. For example, if subunits can adopt and
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implement policy independent of national government influence or control, the country would
be administratively decentralized. Thirdly, who controls representation, and thereby,
participation? The answer to this question places a country on a spectrum of political
decentralization. Often the differences between studies lie in how these different dimensions are
measured, but the underlying distinctions remain in place.
A common theme in the literature is that poorly designed or incompletely implemented
decentralization, on any dimension, is unlikely to produce positive effects on social welfare.
Crook (2003) reviewed political and administrative decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa and
found that weak accountability mechanisms combined with local politics that favored elite
interests impeded pro-poor policy outcomes. Crawford (2008) examined political
decentralization in Ghana, which took place when the central government instituted district
assemblies, and found no effect on poverty reduction. This was ascribed to constraints left in
place by the central government that limited local autonomy, calling into question whether
political decentralization can be effectively implemented from the top down.
Decentralization success stories include countries where implementation was more
complete or well-designed. A quantitative study in Bolivia, where extensive fiscal, administrative,
and political decentralization occurred in 1994, found that it had a substantive and positive effect
on the pattern and quality of human capital formation and social service provision, and that these
changes reflected the preferences of the poorest municipalities (Faguet 2004). A further study
compared Colombia to Bolivia and tested the effect of decentralization on public education
outcomes. In Colombia, the decentralization was fiscal, and enrollment rates increased. In
Bolivia, the decentralization was more comprehensive, and again had the effect of directing
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spending to address social needs, driven by the preferences of the newly empowered rural and
poorest communities (Faguet and Sánchez 2008).
Quantitative Measures of Decentralization. Schneider (2003a, 2003b) developed quantitative
measures of decentralization using factor analysis. His analysis differentiates between types of
decentralization along the usual three dimensions, and measures these dimensions with multiple
indicators, most from the IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) along with other sources
(Schneider 2003a, 41). Fiscal decentralization is measured by subnational expenditures and
revenues as percentages of their respective totals. Administrative decentralization is measured
by taxation and transfers as a percentage of subnational grants and revenues. Political
decentralization is measured as the presence of municipal and/or subunit (state) elections. These
indicators were used in a factor analysis that scored each country where data was available from
zero (pure centralization) to one (pure decentralization) on three dimensions.
Using these factor scores, Schneider (2003b) examined the effect of different types of
centralization on tax capacity and pro-poor expenditures. Fiscal decentralization had no effect
on either. Political centralization had a positive effect on both tax capacity and pro-poor
expenditure. Administrative decentralization had a positive effect on pro-poor expenditures but
no effect on tax capacity. Von Braun and Grote (2000) use the same categories and definitions,
but their indicators vary from Schneider’s. Political decentralization is the same – the presence
of elections at different levels of government. Fiscal decentralization is similar; Von Braun and
Grote use the share of subunit expenditure in total country-wide expenditures. Administrative
decentralization is measured completely differently; they use the amount of subdivision within
the country (when available) and the population size (in multivariate analysis) to signify this type
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of decentralization (Von Braun and Grote 2000, 4). They found in a cross-sectional analysis limited
by data availability that 1) fiscal decentralization reduced poverty (measured with the Human
Development Index) with declining marginal effect; 2) small-population countries (which are
deemed to be more administratively centralized) have lower poverty than large ones; and, 3)
elections at the national level only do not make a difference in poverty over having no elections
at all, but state-level and, even more so, municipal-level elections had a positive effect on poverty
reduction – i.e. political decentralization has a positive effect on reducing poverty (Von Braun
and Grote 2000, 25).
Conclusion. The literature on decentralization and social welfare is methodologically diverse. The
findings in the literature are mixed, but it is difficult to draw solid conclusions given the variety
of definitions and measurements employed in these studies. Qualitative studies have often found
that the promises and actual outcomes of decentralization do not match up. This is frequently
due to incomplete implementation or poor design when countries decentralize. This supports the
choice in this dissertation to focus on measures that capture decentralization quantitatively.
These measures can capture whether decentralization has actually occurred in practice. The
potential exception is political decentralization, since the mere presence of elections at
subnational levels may not necessarily mean that those elections are competitive or effective in
implementing truly representative or responsive government at the subnational level.
Federalism and Social Welfare
The effect of federalism on public policy is a subject of ongoing debate. Pierson (1995)
posits three categories of institutional effects that follow from federal arrangements. Firstly,
federalism changes the strategies, preferences, and influence of existing political actors and
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groups. Secondly, federalism empowers new political actors, namely the subnational
governmental units. Thirdly, typical problems and strategies arise when public policy-making
authority and responsibility are shared among actors, as they are under federalism. Each of these
characteristics of federal systems have implications for social policy-making and, ultimately,
social policy outcomes. Whereas all political systems ask and answer the question of what
policies should be adopted and implemented, federal systems add the questions of who should
decide policies and who should implement them to the mix.
Federalism changes the incentive structure for existing political actors, which affects the
strategies they adopt and the influence they can exert. Most of the differences under federalism
can be expected to have negative consequences for social policies that require redistribution.
Federalism divides a country into a patchwork of political jurisdictions, and the economic markets
that underlie these jurisdictions are rarely contiguous with them. This arrangement can produce
a situation called competitive deregulation. Since capital is mobile, its power is enhanced under
federalism because it can choose to exit a political jurisdiction at any time. Any jurisdiction that
wants to implement generous social policies risks the possibility that businesses who are opposed
to such redistribution will move to another location, which causes inter-jurisdictional
competition to minimize both regulation and social spending (hence the argument that only the
national level of government should attempt redistribution, leaving the sole objective of
jurisdictions like cities to be economic development (Peterson 1981)). Therefore, social programs
can be expected to be less generous and less widespread in federal systems.
Another difference under federalism is that representation is organized along geographic
lines. This provides the opportunity for geographical alliances to emerge among interests that
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under other circumstances might not cooperate, such as capital and labor in high wage versus
low wage regions, often precluding class-based national policy (Pierson 1995, 454). Finally,
federalism complicates the picture of both policy adoption and policy implementation, since
there are many more venues in which these fights can take place, and many more actors
interested in the outcomes (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). Political actors and groups face a
greater array of options when trying to achieve their policy goals. They are likely to target specific
venues or levels of government depending on what they want to achieve (Schattschneider 1975).
Interest groups and other nongovernmental actors care about which venue adopts and
administers which policy because different combinations of these can help them achieve specific
policy content goals. It may be difficult to predict what the effects will be, but it is sure that they
are different than what would happen in a unitary system. The federal institutional system
influences both the options and the strategies available to achieve policy goals.
In addition to the typical actors and groups that vie for power in most political systems,
federalism creates an institutionally powerful new set of actors – the geographic subunits
themselves. Depending on the circumstances, these subunits may compete with, preempt, or
petition the national government. Pierson discusses several ways the introduction of these
subunits can influence social policy. First, governments have historically derived legitimacy from
providing social benefits to their constituents, and this leads to a phenomenon called competitive
state-building (Pierson 1995, 455). In federal systems, both the national level and the subunit
level would like to take this legitimacy for themselves. Therefore, any decision as to what social
programs to provide becomes only part of a more contentious debate over who should provide
them – that is, over jurisdiction. The governments themselves care about policy control
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regardless of content, since that control will allow them to claim credit or assign blame for social
outcomes.
A second and related phenomenon under federalism is policy preemption. Policies are
often pursued at the subunit level and they preempt possibly more sweeping policy changes at
the national level. In other cases, subunits resist policy change at the national level if they have
more comprehensive policies in place already. Either way, the fact that either level may make
policy can limit the policy options that are enacted. Thirdly, policy diffusion may occur, wherein
policies enacted in one subunit are adopted by other subunits or expanded to national policies.
Fourthly, self-sorting by people looking to satisfy their preferences for tax and service packages
(Tiebout 1956) may limit the social programs adopted. Especially in contexts of extreme
fragmentation at levels of government below state or province, the fact that those with resources
can choose to live separately from those without can limit the policies enacted.
These last three possible effects could conceivably result in better or more social policies
enacted, but given the fact that businesses and wealthy people can move out of generous
jurisdictions to ones that have less-generous policies, and therefore perhaps a lower tax burden,
means that in practice federalism is a hindrance to redistribution. A race to the bottom is a more
likely result.
Finally, according to Pierson, federalism introduces a number of problems inherent in
shared policymaking. Firstly, since policy adoption in federalism often involves forming broad but
shallow coalitions, and so many players hold a veto, the resulting policy will usually play to the
lowest common denominator. Secondly, the complexities involved in implementing policy across
levels of government will often result in jurisdictional guarantees and protections being a primary
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goal in policy design, to the detriment of rational or efficient policy. Thirdly, policy options that
limit the need for joint decision making often seem the best under federalism, because the goal
becomes avoiding the vicissitudes of the process rather than enacting the best policy option from
a rationality or efficiency point of view.
Rodden (2010) argues that in democracies with right-skewed income distributions, the
natural tendency is towards redistribution from the rich to the poor. In theory, federalism
prevents redistribution, while in practice some federations have progressive intergovernmental
and interpersonal transfers while others do not. This supports Pierson’s contention that
federalism may not by itself be a causal factor.
Conclusion. Federalism does not ease the path to redistribution, and at best complicates the
situation. This may have an effect on redistributive policies like those that alleviate food security.
The fact that federalism restricts redistributive policy choices, even in situations of political
decentralization, may lead to lower food security than would occur under a unitary system.
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CHAPTER 4 DEMOCRACY, DECENTRALIZATION, AND FEDERALISM: DO THEY
DETERMINE FOOD SECURITY?
Introduction
This chapter presents the data analysis in three sections. The first sections presents the
analysis of democracy and food security. The following two sections cover different measures of
decentralization. All models contain a measure of federalism. In all cases where variables were
significant, the effects were in the expected direction. The findings are mixed: some variables
that were expected to be significant predictors of food security were not significant. Civil liberties
protections and rule of law are consistently strong positive predictors of food security. Political
rights were positively associated with food security in one model. When measured by factor
scores, administrative and fiscal decentralization were found to have the strongest positive effect
on food security, whereas political decentralization was not statistically significant. However,
when measured directly using IMF government finance statistics, neither administrative nor fiscal
decentralization had a statistically significant effect on food security. This may be due to
imprecision in how well the underlying concepts are captured by the measure in question.
Federalism had a consistently strong and negative effect when significant, but it is not significant
in all models.
The Dataset
For this dissertation, I constructed a dataset using secondary data from multiple sources
in order to test hypotheses about the relationship between food security, democracy, federalism,
and decentralization. The data dictionary containing all of the variables employed in this
dissertation is presented in Appendix A. See Table 4.1 for the sources of data.
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Table 4.1. Sources of Data
Data Sources
(Cafiero et al. 2016)
(Schneider 2003a)
Freedom House Civil Liberties Rankings
Freedom House Political Rights Rankings
International Food Policy Research Institute
International Monetary Fund Government Finance Statistics
Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2012)
UN Food and Agriculture Organization Food Security Indicators
UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank,
UN Department of Economic Affairs Population Division)
World Bank Database of Political Institutions

The dataset contains observations for 229 sovereign countries from 1990 to 2011. The total
number of observations is 5308. The complete dataset contains more than one hundred variables
comprising measures of food security, economy, regime type, and other political variables. Given
the sources and subject matter, there is a substantial amount of missing data, and as such, the
complete dataset is not used for any of the models presented. Rather, the relevant subset of data
is analyzed for each model. The variable definitions, sources, and years of coverage for each
model are presented in the sections below.
The Dependent Variable: The Food Security Index
To recap the lengthy discussion in Chapter 2, food security is a complex concept with
three main dimensions: availability, accessibility, and utilization. Firstly, in order for food security
to exist, there must be an adequate food supply to meet the energy and nutrient needs of the
entire population – this is the availability dimension. Food availability is necessary but not
sufficient for food security, however. Secondly, the food that is available must be accessible to
the population – if any subset of the population cannot access enough food, then food security
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will decrease even if there is an adequate food supply. Finally, the utilization dimension captures
how well the population makes use of the food that they can access. Are they eating enough
calories and getting enough nutrients to prevent undernourishment (lack of dietary energy) and
undernutrition (lack of dietary nutrients)? If not, then there will be food insecurity on the
utilization dimension even if there is enough food available and accessible.
Food security, comprising these interrelated dimensions, is particularly well-suited to
measurement by an index, which is a composite measure that combines information from
multiple indicators into one, easily interpretable number. The Food Security Index (FSI) – which
is the Global Hunger Index (IFPRI 2012; Wiesmann 2002) with the scale reversed – will be the
dependent variable in each model presented in this chapter. The FSI is an additive index that
contains three equally weighted dimensions, presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Food Security Index: Components
Indicator
Weight
Prevalence of Undernourishment (%)
1/3
% of children under 5 who are underweight

1/3

% mortality in children under 5

1/3

Dimension
Availability,
Accessibility
Utilization
(Undernourishment)
Utilization
(Undernourishment,
Undernutrition)

Source: (IFPRI 2012; Wiesmann 2002)

Prevalence of undernourishment is the probability (expressed as a percentage) that a randomly
selected person from the population will lack sufficient calories to lead a sedentary life. It is
calculated using measures of food supply, inequality in access to food, and country-specific per
capita calorie minimum thresholds. Therefore, it measures aspects of both the availability and
accessibility dimensions of food security. Underweight in children under five years of age is a
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measure of the percentage of children under five who fall two or more standard deviations below
the mean of weight for age. Underweight is considered to be a measure of undernourishment,
because underweight is caused by a lack of sufficient calories. It measures the utilization
dimension of food security – it captures no direct information about whether food is available or
accessible, but rather the percentage of children under five have been unable to utilize sufficient
food. Mortality in children under five years of age is the last measure, and it is also a measure of
utilization. However, it captures information about both undernourishment and undernutrition,
since both a lack of calories and a lack of sufficient macro- and micronutrients contribute to
mortality in this age group.
To calculate the Food Security Index, each indicator is weighted by a third and summed
together, and then the sum is subtracted from 100:
1
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 100 − [( ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (%)) +
3
1
( ∗ % 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 5 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) +
3
1
( ∗ % 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 5)]
3
The resulting FSI is scaled from zero to 100 where zero indicates total food insecurity and 100
indicates total food security, although neither extreme is found in practice. It is measured in
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011.
Food Security and Democracy
This section presents models that test the theoretical relationship between food security
and democracy. Democracy is not treated as a monolithic concept; rather, I use measures
(discussed below) that attempt to capture two separate dimensions of democracy: political rights
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and institutions (the degree to which the institutions in a country are democratic); and civil
liberties and rule of law (the degree to which fundamental rights are protected and the rule of
law holds).
Hypotheses. The hypotheses tested by these models are as follows:
H1: Countries with more political rights will have higher food security.
H2: Countries with more civil liberties will have higher food security.
Democracy Measure. The two dimensions of democracy are measured using the Freedom House
scales of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2014a). Freedom House produces
annual measures for almost all countries in the world. The Freedom House rankings have two
main categories: political rights, and civil liberties (Freedom House 2014b). The political rights
rating is based on the freeness and fairness of electoral processes, amount and quality of political
pluralism and participation, and quality of government in terms of corruption, transparency, and
effectiveness. The civil liberties rating is based on the degree to which freedom of expression and
belief are protected, the extent of rights of association and organization, the presence and
strength of the rule of law, and the extent of personal autonomy and individual rights in each
country during each measurement year. Both of these groupings represent important – and
different – dimensions of democracy. The ratings are based on in-house analysis of “a broad
range of sources, including news articles, academic analyses, reports from nongovernmental
organizations, and individual professional contacts,” along with consulting external experts in
academia and the larger human rights community; these analyses are applied to answer
questions that score each country on ten indicators of political rights and fifteen indicators of
civil liberties, which are then combined into the two scales (Freedom House 2014b).
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Each scale, as employed in this dissertation, runs from one to seven where one is the
lowest and seven is the highest degree of freedom9. Freedom House uses the terminology of
freedom instead of democracy, and I will occasionally adopt it here to keep clarity between my
measurements and sources. In regression analyses using ordinal variables such as this one,
variables with seven steps or more are often employed as if they are continuous. However, in
order for that to be a reasonable choice, one would have to argue convincingly that the increase
from one to two on one of the scales is equivalent to a movement from two to three, four to five,
or any other increase of one. In addition, treating these scales as continuous overlooks the fact
that the lines between number ratings are not so bright and obvious as the numbers placed on
them would suggest. In order to acknowledge the categorical nature of these measures, I will
employ them in my models having collapsed the one-to-seven scales into three categories. For
both the political rights and civil liberties scales, I classified countries rated one or two as not
free; three to five as partly free; and six or seven as free. I then created dummy variables for each
of the six categories, with a one if the country fell in that category for a particular year, and a
zero otherwise.
Countries that score a one or two on the Freedom House Civil Liberties scale (those I have
categorized as not free) have very few or no civil liberties protections, and do not have due
process. Scores of three to five (categorized as partly free) represent countries that have either
moderate civil liberties protections, or a mixture of strong and weak civil liberties protections.
Scores of six or seven (categorized as free) are given to countries that have a wide range of civil

9

Freedom House publications use a scale of 7 = least free to 1 = most free. This dissertation follows the common
convention of reversing the scale from 1 = least free to 7 = most free, in order to facilitate interpretation. An increase
in the rating then represents more political rights or more civil liberties.
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liberties protections, freedom from discrimination (in most cases), due process and the rule of
law. Countries that score a one or two (categorized as not free) on the Freedom House Political
Rights scale have restricted political rights, limited political parties (sometimes only one), and
may be autocratic or under military rule. Scores of three to five (categorized as partly free) are
given to countries that have moderate protections for political rights, or a mixture of strong and
weak protections. Scores of six or seven (categorized as free) represent countries that have free
and fair elections, effective government, competitive parties, and incorporate minority interests
(to a different extent across the two scores).
For each rating, I chose to use ‘not free’ as my base category, and consequently the
models include only the part free and free categorical variables. The coefficients on those
variables will represent the change expected when moving from not free to either part free or
free along the respective dimension.
Independent Variable Lags. As democracy increases, food security is expected to increase.
However, the time frame for this increase is not clear. There are three reasons to lag the
dependent variable in these models. First, when making a theoretically (if not methodologically)
causal claim, the cause must precede the effect. Secondly, while the percent underweight and
percent mortality measures in the FSI are measured yearly, the prevalence of undernutrition is a
three-year average. To include this measure in models with independent variables within one
year of the FSI would essentially mean that the independent variables and some portion of the
dependent variable are contemporaneous, thus leaving any causal argument on shaky ground.
Third, the complexity of the political systems in question make it unlikely that a movement
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towards democracy will immediately effect policy change. In addition, any policy change made
at the national level will take time to have an effect on the ground.
We are left with a quandary: while we can say easily that a one-year lag is too short, due
to the nature of the FSI components, what is the optimal lag? Even if optimal lags could be
presumed for one component of the FSI, there is no guarantee that a change in democracy will
affect child underweight, child mortality, and prevalence of undernutrition at the same rate.
Choosing a single length for lagging the independent variables may miss important variation.
Therefore, the methodological step I have taken is to estimate three sets of models, with threeyear, four-year, and five-year lagged independent variables.
Multiple Imputation. Following the advice of Ross (2006), all the models presented in this section
are estimated using datasets that have been multiply imputed to correct for bias due to possibly
nonrandom patterns of missingness. Ross used infant mortality as a dependent variable, and
infant mortality (like child mortality) has almost complete data for almost all country years.
Unfortunately, missingness in my data occurred on the dependent variable – some countries had
no FSI measurement for any year in the dataset, so those countries could not be included in the
imputed dataset. However, the percentages of countries that scored not free on the civil liberties
scale in the imputed dataset (19%) and in the complete dataset of all country years (17.62%)
were not significantly different (z = .1878, two-tailed p = .8510). Likewise, the percentages of
countries that scored not free on the political rights scale in the imputed dataset (33%) and in
the complete dataset of all country years (30.59%) were not significantly different from one
another (z = -.2073, two-tailed p = .8358). This supports an argument that my imputed dataset,
even with a number of countries dropped, still has retained a significant percentage of countries
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that score low on these scales – supporting an argument that the imputed dataset still contains
a good number of authoritarian countries. The Global Hunger Index, on which the Food Security
Index is based, is not available for all country years, but rather is published in 5 year increments.
These are more reasonable increments to capture the quantities contained in the FSI, since
prevalence of undernutrition is published as 3 year averages. The Food Security Index has values
for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011 in 118 countries.
I used Amelia II (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011) to perform all multiple imputation in
this project. Amelia II allows the user to specify the time-series cross-sectional structure of the
dataset, in this case being made up of 118 separate countries with 4 observations per country. It
produces a default of five complete imputed datasets, a number that is considered sufficient in
most cases. For the three-year and four-year lagged independent variables, I used the default of
five; for the five-year lagged independent variables, there was proportionally more missing data,
so I instructed Amelia II to create ten imputed datasets. I used the multiple imputation utilities
in Stata 14 to import and manipulate the imputed datasets. Stata 14 allows the user to define
estimation procedures in the context of multiple imputation, so that when model parameters are
estimated, the degree of uncertainty in the multiply imputed datasets is taken into account when
computing standard errors and thus significance levels. Essentially, multiple imputation corrects
the variance-covariance matrix to remove the bias that would have been present had it been
calculated on data using listwise deletion. While none of the significance levels changed for any
of my models when run on the imputed versus nonimputed datasets, some of the coefficients
and standard errors did change in magnitude. Given the consistency of the results between the
imputed and nonimputed data, I present only the models estimated on the imputed dataset.
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Each set of lagged independent variables had a different degree of missingness. For the
dataset with three-year lagged independent variables, 2.966% of the observations would have
been dropped using listwise deletion to deal with missing values. 2.75% of the observations in
the four-year lagged models would have been dropped using listwise deletion. 5.93% of the
observations in the five-year lagged models would have been dropped without the use of
multiple imputation. Using multiple imputation obviated the need to use listwise deletion to drop
any country with a FSI value that also had missing data in other variables.
Variables and Measures. The models presented here include the democracy measures outlined
above, the usual categorical variable for federalism, and two controls. The first is the natural log
of GDP per Capita, which I employ as a measure of economic development. The second control
variable is a dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa, which is one if a country is in sub-Saharan
Africa.
Descriptive statistics for the datasets are presented in Table 4.3. These are calculated on
the imputed datasets, so standard errors are provided that take into account the uncertainty
across imputations. Table B.1 in Appendix B presents the list of countries that are included in the
models reported in this section.
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Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Food Security and Democracy Models (Multiple
Imputation).
Standard
Variable
Mean
Error
Food Security
86.476
.4559
Index
3 year lag
4 year lag
5 year lag
Standard
Standard
Standard
Mean
Error
Mean
Error
Mean
Error
Civil Liberties:
.6631
.02184
.6754
.02160
.6419
.02244
Part Free
Civil Liberties:
.1483
.01646
.1364
.01604
.1536
.01717
Free
Political Rights:
.4174
.02278
.4013
.02297
.3877
.02305
Part Free
Political Rights:
.2508
.02002
.2614
.02035
.2551
.02050
Free
GDP per capita
7.05612
.05504
7.02089
.05369
6.9619
.05340
(ln)
Federalism
.1081
.01430
.1081
.01430
.1059
.01418
sub-Saharan
.3559
.02206
.3559
.02206
.3559
.02206
Africa (1=Yes)
The Models. The initial estimations of all models included all four democracy measures in each
model. None of them were statistically significant. The bivariate correlations among the
measures suggest that they may be highly collinear – that is, a country that scores as part free on
the civil liberties scale is likely to be in the same category on the political rights scale. To separate
the effects of the two dimensions of democracy, I estimated models separately, one set with the
civil liberties dummies and one set with the political rights dummies. Interestingly, the effect sizes
were consistent across the models that included all four dummy variables and those that included
only two – only the standard errors changed significantly. This supports the argument that
multicollinearity was inducing too much uncertainty for the variables to appear significant, while
leaving the coefficients themselves unbiased.
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The models are estimated in Stata 14 using linear regression with panel-corrected
standard errors. Each model exhibited first order autocorrelation, which was addressed by
specifying that the correlation type was AR1. This results in Stata using Prais-Winsten regression
for the coefficients. Table 4.4 gives the regression results. The significance level used in these
models is alpha = .05.
Table 4.4. Estimates for Models with Freedom House Democracy Measures, DV = FSI in 4
panels (1995, 2000, 2005, 2011)
3 year lag
4 year lag
5 year lag
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
GDP per capita 4.07760*
4.09826*
3.9587*
4.0040*
3.8413*
3.8556*
(ln)
(.8051)
(.8237)
(.8385)
(.8551)
(.8209)
(.8519)
Federalism
-1.3139*
-1.3903*
-1.1716
-1.4304* -1.04959
-1.0891
(.5558)
(.5712)
(.6650)
(.6504)
(.7303)
(.8157)
sub-Saharan
-7.5808*
-7.4126*
-7.7530*
-7.5644* -7.9325*
-7.8544*
Africa
(1.1499)
(1.09215)
(1.1105)
(1.04759) (1.09355) (1.08751)
Civil Liberties:
1.3982*
1.2354
1.1205*
Part free
(.6090)
(.7354)
(.5505)
Civil Liberties:
1.6899*
1.8537*
1.8276*
Free
(.8030)
(.8308)
(.7568)
Political
.7787
1.2985
.4424
Rights:
(.6307)
(.7518)
(.5046)
Part Free
Political
1.1197
1.4458*
1.0002
Rights: Free
(.6785)
(.7015)
(.5581)
Constant
59.1128*
59.4897*
60.2274* 60.07626* 61.4634* 61.9209*
(5.8384)
(5.9422)
(6.3502)
(6.3769)
(6.2910)
(6.3383)
Regression Statistics
n
472
472
472
472
472
472
Number of
118
118
118
118
118
118
Countries
F
21.18*
23.04*
22.72*
28.25*
19.76*
21.05*
p-value of F
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
RMSE
5.6173
5.6201
5.6842
5.6853
5.6601
5.7020
Number of
5
5
5
5
10
10
Imputations
*p (two-tailed) < .05
Each cell contains the unstandardized coefficients and the standard error in parentheses.

78

Findings. In all models, the natural log of GDP per capita had a strong positive effect on food
security of approximately four points on the Food Security Index. Contrary to expectations, the
further the GDP variable is lagged, the lower the effect, although substantively the differences
between the coefficients are very small – all of them are within 0.2 of each other. Being located
in sub-Saharan Africa is a strong negative predictor across all models with coefficients between 7.5 and -8. These increase as the lag increases within model specification – that is, the coefficients
in the civil liberties models increase as the lag increases, and likewise with those in the political
rights models.
Federalism is significant in three of the six models. It is significant in both models with
three-year lagged independent variables, and also in the political rights model with four-year
lagged independent variables. Federalism was not significant in either of the five-year lagged
models. I expected federalism to negatively affect food security, and that hypothesis is
supported, and certainly not contradicted. The coefficients are consistent and negative across
the models where they are significant. They range from -1.4304 to -1.3139, which is in the
expected direction.
Across all the models, effect size and direction for federalism is consistent, even when the
coefficients are not significant. This suggests a fairly robust result. Slightly lower effect sizes
(reflected in the decreasing coefficients) and slightly more uncertainty (reflected in the increasing
standard errors) combine to make the coefficients lose significance as the lag increases. This
suggests that federalism impacts food security more in the short term (within two to three years),
and that impact is attenuated in the longer term (five years or longer).
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Models 1, 3, and 5 included dummy variables measuring civil liberties and rule of law: Civil
Liberties: Part Free; and Civil Liberties: Free. Five out of the six coefficients were statistically
significant. In the four-year lag model, Civil Liberties: Part Free was not significant (two-tailed p
= .093). In all instances where the coefficients were significant, the relationship was positive and
substantive. The root mean square error (RMSE) gives a measure of accuracy for a model: the
lower the RMSE, the lower the average prediction error when using that model to predict the
observed data. Therefore, the RMSE can be used to compare models that have the same
dependent variable measured in the same units. Using the RMSE as my decision criterion, I will
discuss the three-year lag model (Model 1) in detail, because that model has the lowest root
mean square error (RMSE = 5.6173).
As previously discussed, the seven-point Freedom House Civil Liberties scale was
transformed into three dummy variables: Not Free (1-2); Partly Free (3-5); and, Free (6-7). Civil
Liberties: Not Free serves as the baseline category; therefore, it was not included in the models.
The coefficients represent the effect size and direction of being in each category in comparison
to the baseline. Turning to Model 1, then: holding all other independent variables constant, being
partly free with respect to civil liberties is associated with a 1.3982 increase in the Food Security
Index, as compared with being in the not free category. The effect size is larger for the Civil
Liberties: Free category. Holding all other independent variables constant, a country that is free
on the civil liberties scale is expected to be 1.6899 points higher on the Food Security Index than
an equivalent country that is not free on the civil liberties scale.
Taken together, these two results support H2. To the extent to which these measures
capture the concept as intended, countries with more civil liberties have higher food security.
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Civil liberties are a dimension of the expansive definition of democracy employed in this
dissertation. This model provides strong support that more democracy, in the form of stronger
civil liberties protections and increased rule of law, is indeed associated with higher food security.
The only statistically significant coefficient on a Political Rights categorical variable is in
Model 4, where Political Rights: Free is significant and positive. It is worth noting that this same
variable is nearly significant in Model 6 – the five-year lag model – with a two-tailed p-value of
.075, and has a two-tailed p-value of .101 in the three-year lag model. These nearly significant
results provide reason to think that the significant result in Model 4 is not simply a fluke. Holding
all other independent variables constant, a country that is free on the political rights scale is
expected to have a Food Security Index 1.4458 points higher than a country that is not free on
the political rights scale. When it comes to political rights, it seems that a move from not free to
partly free does not have a significant effect – only once a country moves to completely free,
does food security increase. This result supports H1, that more political rights will be associated
with higher food security. But not just any increase in political rights will do – elections must be
free and fair, parties must be competitive, government must effectively control its purview, and
barriers to political participation must be nearly nonexistent before food security will increase.
Discussion. These results provide strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 2: countries with more
political rights and more civil liberties, respectively, have more food security. However, the
results go further than that: there are significant differences between political rights and civil
liberties in the magnitude, time frame, and consistency of their associations with food security.
The magnitude of the increase in food security that follows from an opening in civil
liberties is largest when moving between the not free and the partly free categories; the increase
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in food security that accompanies a move from partly free to free, while still positive, is much
smaller. Taking the three-year lag model as an example, moving from not free to part free on the
civil liberties dimension produces an increase in FSI of 1.3982 points. Moving from part free to
free, however, increases the FSI by only an additional .2917 points. This means that about 83
percent of the total increase in food security that results from an opening in civil liberties comes
when the opening is still only partial (not free to partly free). The full transition to free on the civil
liberties dimension increases food security only another 17 percent. In the five-year lagged
model, the relative strength remains the same although the magnitude is different: the
movement from not free to partly free accounts for 61 percent of the increase in food security,
while the further move to fully free adds another 39 percent. This implies that the initial opening
from complete repression of civil liberties to even partial protections allows for mobilization
within society that will push politicians to pay attention to food insecurity and become more
responsive. This may take different forms in different countries. Freedom of speech or protest in
one country may bring pressure onto politicians, whereas freedom of the press may be the
deciding factor in another (Dreze and Sen 1991). Further research could focus on a typology of
civil liberties as the independent variable, which could illuminate which ones are most effective
at increasing social welfare.
Political rights, in contrast, are only associated with higher food security if the opening is
complete. Partial freedom on the political rights dimension is never associated with higher food
security at any lag. This suggests that the mechanism by which political rights increase food
security only works if a country’s people enjoy the full measure of political rights. Perhaps it is
only then that parties and politicians who truly represent the interests of the food insecure can
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be elected. This too is a question for further research. Another difference is that political rights
do not increase food security as much as civil liberties do. Going from not free to free on the civil
liberties dimension increases FSI by between 1.6899 and 1.8537 points, depending on the lag,
whereas the same increase on the political rights dimension increases FSI by only 1.4458 points.
This could mean that the political power afforded to people by the exercise of civil liberties is
more effective than that exercised at the ballot box.
A final intriguing difference between civil liberties and political rights in their effect on
food security is that civil liberties have a much more consistent effect. Civil liberties were
associated with more food security at three-year, four-year, and five-year lags. This suggests that
civil liberties provide a continuous opportunity to mobilize and keep up the pressure on
government to respond to food insecurity. Political rights were only associated with more food
security at a four-year lag. Recall that prior research found that budget expenditures on hunger
were related to electoral cycles in some countries (te Lintelo et al. 2014). Perhaps this could
explain the intermittent nature of the association between political rights and food security – if
effective political pressure through voting behavior is tied to election cycles then I would expect
the effect of political rights on food security would go in cycles as well. It may be fruitful to
examine whether there is an “election effect” on food security. Future research could include a
variable that signifies the number of years since the most recent election and see if that is
negatively related to food security.
The analysis presented in this section, based upon the statistical models presented here,
shows that democracy is an important determinant of food security. Both political rights and civil
liberties are predictors of food security. However, these two dimensions of democracy support
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food security in different ways. This suggests that a simplified definition of democracy that
focuses on elections alone would miss many of the nuances in the relationship between
democracy and food security. In fact, a procedural measurement of democracy that focuses on
political institutions might not capture the relationship at all, given that civil liberties comprise
the most consistent predictor of increased food security.
Food Security and Decentralization: Model 1: Factor Scores
The first model examines the relationship between decentralization and food security. It
tests four hypotheses. Recall from Chapter 3 that decentralization is typically understood to have
three distinct dimensions. Fiscal decentralization is the degree to which the subnational
governmental units in a country have control over their own expenditure choices and revenues.
Administrative decentralization is the extent to which subnational units control policy choice and
implementation. Political decentralization is the extent to which a country has elections at
subnational levels of government. Each of the three dimensions can be expected to have an effect
on food security, independent of the others. Therefore, I will employ one hypothesis for each
dimension:
H1: Countries that are fiscally decentralized will have more food security.
H2: Countries that are administratively decentralized will have more food security.
H3: Countries that are politically decentralized will have more food security.
Formal federalism – that is, federalism that is constitutionally defined – is a different matter than
decentralization. Constitutionally mandated federalism introduces a number of complications for
policy makers who wish to adopt and implement redistributive policies like those that address
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food insecurity. It also provides more points of access for those who wish to block policy.
Therefore, I propose one hypothesis to test the effect of formal federalism on food security:
H4: Federations will have less food security.
These hypotheses are tested using a cross-sectional dataset of 42 countries. The dependent
variable is measured in the year 2000 and the independent variables are measured in 1996, in
order to preserve the direction of causation when interpreting the model.
Variables and Measures. Four explanatory variables are included in this model. The first is
Federalism, which is a dummy variable that takes a one if a country formally defines itself as a
federation. While federalism conceptually implies decentralization, in practice a country defined
as federation can be quite centralized, and federalism itself causes a number of issues that can
obstruct policy formation, adoption, and implementation, as discussed in the literature review. I
expect that formal federalism will have a negative relationship with food security.
Three variables capture aspects of decentralization. Fiscal, administrative, and political
decentralization are measured as factor scores produced by Schneider (2003a). The three types
of decentralization are measured by, respectively, subnational expenditures and revenues as
percentages of their respective totals, taxation and transfers as a percentage of subnational
grants and revenues, and the presence of municipal and/or subunit (state or provincial) elections
(Schneider 2003a, 41). These indicators were subjected to a factor analysis that scored each
country where data was available on three dimensions from zero (completely centralized) to one
(completely decentralized). Confirmatory factor analysis supported the hypothesis that
decentralization has three distinct dimensions.
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Subnational expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures, and
subnational revenues as a percentage of total government revenues are the indicators for fiscal
decentralization. Expenditures (cash outlays) and revenues (cash inflows) together measure the
fiscal impact of subnational governments. Percentage of subnational revenues that come from
taxes and percentage of subnational revenues that do not come from transfers measure
administrative decentralization. Schneider argues that these two indicators capture the degree
to which subnational governments control their own resources, thus are administratively
separate from the central government. I am not entirely convinced by this argument, as these
indicators do not seem to capture the implementation and policy control aspects of
administrative decentralization. Still, the factor analysis Schneider presents clearly shows that
these two indicators correlate along a different dimension than the fiscal indicators do. The final
dimension, political decentralization, is measured by the existence of municipal and state or
provincial elections. These measures straightforwardly capture formal representation at
subnational levels of government, but neglect to measure the quality of elections or whether
they result in qualitatively representative and responsive governance at the subnational level. I
expect each of the three factor scores to be positive predictors of food security.
Two control variables are included in this model. The first control is GDP per capita
measured in 2014 US Dollars. This variable has been transformed by taking the natural log to
linearize the relationship between FSI and GDP per capita. Food security is expected to increase
with higher levels of economic development, as captured by GDP per capita. The second control
variable is a dummy variable for sub-Saharan African. If a country is in sub-Saharan Africa, this
variable takes a value of one. This variable captures variation that is specific to sub-Saharan

86

Africa, which suffers from a combination of specific factors including poor climate, land
degradation, and disease burden that cause it to have a higher food insecurity on average. I would
have preferred to include subregional level fixed effects that would capture unmeasured
variation across all subregions, but this dataset, in a few pivotal cases (particularly India in South
Asia), has only one country per subregion – thus conflating subregion-level fixed effects with
country-level fixed effects and wreaking havoc in the residuals. Descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 4.5, correlations in Table 4.6, and scatter plots for each combination of
variables are presented in Figure 4.1. Table B.2 in Appendix B presents the list of countries
included in the model presented in this section.
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Table 4.5. Descriptive Statistics for Decentralization Model 1 with Factor Scores
Variable
Observations Mean
Standard
Minimum
Deviation
Food Security Index
42
90.3905
6.6528
75.2
Federalism (1 = Yes)
42
.1429
.3542
0
Fiscal
42
.3698
.2267
0
Decentralization
Administrative
42
.5731
.2562
0
Decentralization
Political
42
.4905
.2962
0
Decentralization
GDP per capita (ln)
42
7.3772
.9214
5.1822
sub-Saharan Africa
42
.1429
.3542
0
(1 = Yes)

Maximum
98.6
1
1
1
1
8.9512
1
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Figure 4.1. Bivariate Scatterplots for Decentralization Model 1
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Model Equation and Results. The equation to be estimated is:
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽5 ∗ ln(𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐺𝐷𝑃) + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑏-𝑆𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎 + 𝜖
The regression equation was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression in Stata 14
and the results are presented in Table 4.7. The significance level for this model (and indeed all of
the models presented in this dissertation) is set at α = .05.
Table 4.7. Decentralization Model 1 Estimates, DV = FSI in 2000
Model 1
95% Confidence Interval for β
Federalism (1 = Yes)
-6.4504*
-11.3543
-1.5466
(2.4156)
Fiscal Decentralization
10.7749*
3.1261
18.4237
(3.7677)
Administrative Decentralization
6.9156*
1.4339
12.3974
(2.7002)
Political Decentralization
-.7602
-5.9343
4.4139
(2.5487)
GDP per capita (ln)
6.0600*
4.2732
7.8467
(.8801)
sub-Saharan Africa (1 = Yes)
-4.4918*
-8.4796
-.5040
(1.9643)
Constant
39.6740*
24.9886
54.3594
(7.2338)
Regression Statistics
R2
0.6681
2
Adjusted R
0.6112
RMSE
4.1482
F
11.74*
n
42
* p < .05 (two-tailed tests)
Each cell contains the unstandardized coefficient and the
standard error in parentheses.

The model explains 66.81% of the variation in the Food Security Index. All of the coefficient
estimates are significant and in the expected direction except for political decentralization. The
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F test statistic was significant, showing that the set of all independent variables is jointly related
to the FSI. The Root Mean Square Error is 4.1482, which means that if this model were used to
predict the FSI, the average error would be 4.1482. The model is robust to alternative
specifications, except that when interactions10 between the explanatory variables were included,
neither the interactions nor the individual variables were significant. This result is likely due to
the multicollinearity introduced by interactions in a dataset with such a low number of
observations. The model was subjected to a battery of post-estimation tests which found no
violations of regression assumptions, multicollinearity, or omitted variable bias.
I considered the possibility that Federalism and Political Decentralization were both
measuring the same concept and that this was leading to the lack of significance for Political
Decentralization when both variables were included. Different combinations of these two
variables were tested, including interactions, and the results were robust. Federalism was always
statistically significant with a negative coefficient and Political Decentralization was never
significant. This may seem surprising, but it is explicable: the factor analytic nature of the Political
Decentralization measure means that it does not function as a dummy variable indicator of
subnational elections. Rather it captures the placement of a country on a zero to one scale of
political decentralization as measured by the combination of the six indicators that were used to
calculated the three factor scores (Schneider 2003a). Each of the six indicators partially measure

10

The following interactions were included in alternative specifications, separately and together, in all possible
combinations: Fiscal Decentralization x Federalism; Administrative Decentralization x Federalism; Political
Decentralization x Federalism; Fiscal Decentralization x Administrative Decentralization; Fiscal Decentralization x
Political Decentralization; Administrative Decentralization x Political Decentralization. Federalism retained
significance in almost all the models, and when it was not significant it was near-significant (p < .10) and the
coefficient was always large and negative. Any single interaction or combination of interactions immediately caused
all decentralization variables to lose significance, probably due to multicollinearity between the interactions and the
constituent variables combined with the relatively small sample size.
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each of the three dimensions, because “the indicators largely measure one of the dimensions
and can be clustered according to this principal component, but the effects of other dimensions
also spill over into each indicator. This spill-over can be explained as the result of the fact that
the dimensions are related to one another and also because the indicators are only imperfect
measures of any single dimension” (Schneider 2003a, 47). Fiscal decentralization relates
moderately to political decentralization in the factor analysis, so a fiscally centralized country will
score lower on political decentralization even if that country has both state/provincial and local
elections.
Findings. Of the first three hypotheses, two are supported – both fiscal decentralization and
administrative decentralization are statistically significant and positively related to food security.
See Figure 4.2 for a graphical representation of the expected change in FSI as fiscal and
administrative decentralization increases.
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Figure 4.2. Food Security and Two Types of Decentralization
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Fiscal decentralization has the strongest positive relationship with the Food Security Index out of
any of the independent variables. Figure 4.2 shows the relative strength of this relationship
compared with the relationship between FSI and administrative decentralization; the steeper the
slope the stronger the predictive relationship. The movement from full fiscal centralization (fiscal
decentralization = 0) to full fiscal decentralization (fiscal decentralization = 1) is associated with
an increase of 10.7749 in the FSI, holding all other independent variables constant. Smaller
increments of fiscal decentralization would also be expected to have a positive effect. For
example, an increase in fiscal decentralization of 0.25 would be expected to increase FSI by about
2.7 on average.
Administrative decentralization also has a positive relationship with food security,
although it is not as strong as fiscal decentralization. As a country moves from totally centralized
administratively (administrative decentralization = 0) to totally centralized (administrative
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decentralization = 1), the Food Security Index is expected to increase by 6.9156 on average,
holding all the other independent variables constant. This result supports the second hypothesis:
administrative decentralization is associated with higher food security.
Political decentralization was not a statistically significant predictor of food security, and
this result was consistent across all plausible alternative model specifications. Therefore, the
third hypothesis, that political decentralized countries would have higher food security, is not
supported. This casts doubt on theories that subnational elections, which allow for votingenforced accountability, will result in local and state or provincial politicians attending to issues
like food insecurity. However, as the qualitative studies in the literature review point out, the
mere existence of subnational elections does not insure that political decentralization has truly
taken place. It could be that no association is found here because this measurement is unable to
differentiate between countries that have decentralized in an effective way and those that have
not.
Federalism has a strong, negative relationship with the Food Security Index, a result which
supports the fourth hypothesis. Federations are expected to have an FSI 6.4504 lower on average
than countries with unitary government systems, holding all other independent variables
constant.
The control variables were both significant and their effects were in the expected
direction. An increase of one in the natural log of GDP per capita is associated with 6.06 expected
increase in the Food Security Index, holding all other independent variables constant. SubSaharan African countries are expected to have a Food Security Index on average 4.4918 lower
than countries outside of that region, holding all other variables constant.
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Discussion. These results support the first two hypotheses: administrative decentralization and
fiscal decentralization are associated with better food security. Political decentralization, as
measured by the factor score, does not predict food security; therefore, the third hypothesis in
not supported by this model. Federalism is a significant negative predictor of food security, which
supports the fourth hypothesis. Strikingly, these three significant measures individually each
have greater impact on food security than a one-point increase in the natural log of GDP per
capita.11
Theory predicted that decentralization ought to produce better social outcomes due to
the efficiency gains from the ability to tailor policies to address local problems and satisfy local
policy preferences. I argued that decentralization should lead to: better problem definition since
definitions can be specific to local circumstances; better targeting of policies since local
information will be the most accurate with respect to identifying those in need; and more
avenues for political pressure and mobilization, thus increasing responsiveness of government to
local needs.
These results show that fiscal decentralization, indeed, is the single most important
determinant of food security in any of the models presented in this dissertation. Fiscal
decentralization is operationalized in this model as the degree to which revenues are collected
and expenditures occur at the subnational level. Administrative decentralization is about twothirds as strong in its association with increased food security. Administrative decentralization

11

A one-point increase in the natural log of GDP per capita, when expressed in dollars, represents different
magnitudes of change at different levels of income. For example, if a country began at $1000 per capita GDP, a onepoint increase in the natural log of GDP per capita would bring that country up to $2725 per capita GDP. A further
one-point increase in the natural log of GDP per capita would bring that same country up to about $7400 per capita
GDP.
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here is operationalized as the degree to which subnational governments control their own
resources, by measuring the relative percentage of tax as a portion of revenues and the relative
percentage of revenues that are not transfers from other levels of governments (which often
come with strings attached that limit local autonomy). These results taken together suggest that
having sufficient resources under the control of relevant local and subnational decision makers
is important to produce food security. These decision makers might be elected politicians or
appointed bureaucrats – the measures do not differentiate between types. It is the local control
of resources that seems to make the difference.
If democratically elected local leadership matters for food security, then that should show
up as a significant coefficient on political decentralization – but political decentralization was not
significant. I am hesitant to claim that this proves that local or subnational democracy does not
matter, however. Here, political decentralization was captured by the presence of local and
subnational elections. Too much of the qualitative literature emphasizes that the presence of
elections does not guarantee that local elected officials will be independent of central authority
or be able to exercise effective power. Therefore, this result warrants further investigation. A
measure that captured more qualitative information about local competitiveness of elections, or
autonomy on the part of subnational leaders, might shed more light on the matter.
In the next section, I test similar hypotheses using alternative measurements of
decentralization on a time-series cross-sectional dataset.
Food Security and Decentralization: Model 2: IMF measures
The second set of models examining the relationship between food security and
decentralization employ a number of indicators gathered by the International Monetary Fund in
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the Government Finance Statistics database. These indicators are used to test the following
hypotheses:
H1: Countries that are fiscally decentralized will have more food security.
H2: Countries that are administratively decentralized will have more food security.
The hypotheses are tested using a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset of a maximum of 54
countries at four time periods. The models are estimated using linear regression with panel
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) (Beck and Katz 1995).
Variables and Measures. The Food Security Index (FSI) is the dependent variable, and it is
measured at four points in time: 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011. The FSI varies both within and
between the countries across the time periods. This can be seen in the spaghetti plot shown in
Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. Spaghetti Plot of the Food Security Index in 54 Countries from 1995 - 2011.

The IMF Government Finance Statistics dataset comprises statistics from IMF member
countries, although not all countries report data on all measures (Dziobek, Gutierrez Mangas,
and Kufa 2011). The variables incorporated into my full dataset are from 1990 to 2011, although
the specific observations used in the models in this section are from 1990 to 2008. The indicators
considered in these models are presented in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8. IMF Decentralization Indicators
Indicator (Variable Name)
Local Government Expenditures as share
of Total Government Expenditures (%)
Subnational Government Expenditures
as a share of Total Government
Expenditures (%)
Local Government Revenues as a share
of Total Government Revenues (%)
Subnational Government Revenues as a
share of Total Government Revenues (%)
Local Government Tax Revenue as a
share of Total Local Government
Revenue (%)
Subnational Government Tax Revenue as
a share of Total Subnational
Government Revenue (%)
Local Government Compensation of
Employees as a share of Total
Government Compensation of
Employees (%)
Subnational Government Compensation
of Employees as a share of Total
Government Compensation of
Employees (%)

Variable
Name
lclExp

Dimension of
Decentralization
Fiscal

SNExp

Fiscal

lclRev_TG

Fiscal

SNRev_TG

Fiscal

lclTax_Rev

Administrative

SNTax_Rev

Administrative

lclCmpEmp

Administrative

SNCmpEmp

Administrative

The IMF employs the subnational versions of these indicators as measures of fiscal
decentralization (Dziobek, Gutierrez Mangas, and Kufa 2011). Following Schneider’s (2003a)
reasoning, subnational and local expenditures and revenues are clearly measures of fiscal
decentralization. However, subnational and local tax revenues as shares of their respective
revenue streams would seem to answer both the question of who controls the money (fiscal
decentralization) and capture the level of autonomy of who implements and controls policy
(administrative decentralization). However, collecting more taxes that are kept at and controlled
by the local or subnational government level certainly implies more control over how that money
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is spent (therefore implying a higher degree of policy control). Following this reasoning, I classify
these two indicators as capturing administrative decentralization. The final two indicators are
local and subnational shares of compensation of employees. As far as these indicators represent
the share of employees at each governmental level, they most closely approximate
administrative decentralization.
The year in which each indicator is measured varies, based on the availability of data. The
first choice was a four-year lag, to test the same lag that was employed in the factor score model.
When this year was not available, I first chose a three-year lag, and if data was not available then
either, a five-year lag. This is a more conservative decisional ordering, since presumably whatever
effect was seen after four years would be attenuated by using a three-year lag whereas it would
be strengthened by using a five-year lag. Missingness in this dataset is not expected to have a
systematic relationship with any of the variables, and so the dataset is used as it is.
Formal federalism is included as a dummy variable in this model with one for federal and
zero for not federal. Sub-Saharan Africa and GDP per capita (ln) were once again used as control
variables. Table 4.9 contains the descriptive statistics for this dataset. Tables B.2, B.3, B.4, and
B.5 in Appendix B present the countries included in each model presented in this section.
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Table 4.9. Descriptive Statistics for Decentralization Models with IMF Measures
Standard
Variable
Observations Mean
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
FSI
144
91.6854
7.1293
69
99.4
SNExp
75
21.4455
15.8240
.60862
68.2193
SNRev_TG
86
22.2022
16.5928
.6473
71.4723
SNTax_Rev
133
41.7436
23.5918
.9185
100
SNCmpEmp
80
28.8048
23.0517
.2038
76.4562
lclExp
75
16.8475
12.7760
.2750
68.2193
lclRev_TG
88
16.6599
12.8606
.1444
71.4723
lclTax_Rev
139
41.6049
24.2499
.9185
100
lclCmpEmp
82
21.7161
20.5230
.2038
75.5697
GDP per Capita
144
7.5523
1.0129
4.7792
9.7046
(ln)
sub-Saharan
144
.1806
.3860
0
1
Africa
Federalism
144
.125
.3319
0
1
Correlations are shown in Table 4.10 for the Subnational government variables, and Table 4.11
for the Local government variables.
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The correlation matrices show that there is considerable risk of multicollinearity if all four
decentralization indicators were to be included in a single model. Subnational revenue as a share
of total government revenue (SNRev_TG) and subnational expenditures as a share of total
government expenditures (SNExp) are nearly perfectly correlated12, with a Pearson’s r of .9875.
Subnational compensation of employees as a share of total government compensation of
employees (SNCmpEmp) is strongly correlated with subnational expenditures (SNExp) with a
Pearson’s r of .9085. Subnational compensation of employees (SNCmpEmp) is also strongly
correlated with subnational government revenues as a share of total government revenues
(SNRev_TG) with a Pearson’s r of 0.8902. Local government decentralization indicators have the
same problem. Local expenditures as a share of total government expenditures (lclExp) and local
revenues as a share of total government revenues (lclRev_TG) are almost perfectly correlated,
with a Pearson’s r of .9864. Local expenditures (lclExp) and local compensation of employees as
a share of total government compensation of employees (lclCmpEmp) are strongly correlated
(Pearson’s r = .8991). Finally, local revenues (lclRev_TG) are strongly correlated with local
compensation of employees (lclCmpEmp) with a Pearson’s r of .8726. The only one of the four
indicators that escapes strong correlations with the others is the share of local or subnational
revenue that comes from taxes (lclTax_Rev, SNTax_Rev). Due to this complication within the
data, I will estimate several models that include the three problematic variables paired with
subnational or local revenues from taxes.

12

Pearson’s r varies from -1 (perfect negative correlation) to 1 (perfect positive correlation). A Pearson’s r of 0
indicates no correlation between the two variables.
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Models and Results. The models presented in this section were estimated in Stata 14. The
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation showed that each model exhibited first-order (AR1)
autocorrelation (Drukker 2003). AR1 correlation means that the errors at time t are correlated
with the errors in the previous time period. If it is not accounted for, such correlation leads to
optimistic standard errors and p-values that are too small – causing the conclusion that slope
coefficients are significant when they really are not. Given that AR1 correlation is present in these
models, I used the procedure xtpcse with an AR1 correlation structure specified when estimating
the models, which produces linear estimates using a Prais-Winsten regression with panel
corrected standard errors (PCSEs). The results are presented in Table 4.12. This significance level
for these models is α = .05.
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Table 4.12. Estimates for IMF Subnational Decentralization Models, DV = FSI in 4 panels
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
GDP per capita (ln)
2.9603*
3.1019*
2.6349*
3.9581*
(.5967)
(.6895)
(.4971)
(.7833)
sub-Saharan Africa
-5.4574*
-4.8465*
-5.3672*
-6.8990*
(.5478)
(1.1844)
(1.5859)
(1.4914)
Federalism
.6626
.3465
1.2350
-3.09682*
(.9088)
(.7944)
(1.8061)
(.8555)
SNTax_Rev
.01346
.009036
.01698
.01761
(.01612)
(.01399)
(.01884)
(.02093)
SNExp
-.01295
(.03297)
SNRev_TG
-.004940
(.02427)
SNCmpEmp
-.008693
(.01754)
Constant
71.0712*
69.8041*
73.5851*
62.3377*
(4.9808)
(5.6357)
(4.4822)
(6.9991)
Regression Statistics
n
70
81
76
132
Number of Countries
40
42
39
59
2
R
.9678
.9712
.5152
.9591
2
Wald χ
744.57*
355.64*
54.79*
85.85*
*p < .05
Each cell contains the unstandardized coefficients and the standard error in parentheses.

Findings. These results do not support either hypothesis that fiscal or administrative
decentralization is associated with higher food security.
Federalism was only significant in Model 4. Note that Model 4 also has the highest
number of observations and countries. Similar to the result found in the model in the previous
section, federalism had a negative relationship with the FSI. A federal country is expected to have
a Food Security Index on average 3.09682 points lower than a non-federal country, holding all
other independent variables constant. This adds to the evidence that when federalism is
significant, it is consistently a negative predictor of food security, and substantively quite large.
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The natural log of GDP per capita and the sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable showed a
consistently strong relationship with food security. In the case of GDP per capita, that relationship
is strong and positive across models, whereas a country being located in sub-Saharan Africa is
consistently associated with lower food security.
I do not present the results for the local government decentralization measures here,
because they are commensurate with the results from the subnational decentralization
measures. I also estimated models for each cross-section, again with no substantively or
statistically significant results. In short, these models provide no support for the hypotheses that
differentiate federalism from different dimensions of decentralization.
Discussion. These models do not support the proposition that administrative or fiscal
decentralization is related to food security. In the previous section, the cross-sectional model
showed strong support for these propositions. So what are we to take away from this section?
There are two ways to view this. First, the results presented in this section may be less reliable
because direct measures were used instead of being decomposed into factor scores. Factor
scores methodologically differentiate related measures along underlying dimensions, removing
the correlations between measures by making them orthogonal to one another. It could be that
the measures in their original form (not factored) do not capture the underlying dimensions of
decentralization, or that they conflate concepts (in this case administrative and fiscal
decentralization), muddying the measures so much as to render them unusable in model
estimation. This would imply that the lack of results is due to measurement error, and we should
rely on the results from the factor score model. On the other hand, the factor score model was
based on a limited sample of countries (determined by data availability), and was cross-sectional.
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It could be that the results that were found were an artifact of either the sample or the time
period that was used. The only conclusion one can draw with certainty is that this dissertation
presents some promising results that warrant further investigation to see whether they can be
confirmed.
Conclusion
The statistical analyses presented here provide support for many of the hypotheses
proposed in this dissertation. Federalism is associated with lower food security. Administrative
and fiscal decentralization are both strongly associated with higher food security in my crosssectional factor score model. However, in the time-series cross-sectional models that use direct
measures of administrative and fiscal decentralization, neither one is a significant predictor of
food security. Democracy is positively associated with food security, with the strongest and most
consistent results showing that civil liberties may be relatively more important than political
rights.
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CHAPTER 5 POLITICS AND FOOD SECURITY: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
Introduction
Food security is partly determined by politics. This dissertation examined three political
determinants of food security: democracy, decentralization, and federalism. Each one was
operationalized and tested against food security using different subsets of a dataset of all
countries from 1990 to 2011. Democracy was divided along two dimensions: political rights and
civil liberties. Both are significant positive predictors of food security. Increases in civil liberties
are more consistently and strongly associated with food security than increases in political rights.
Decentralization was assessed along three dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political. Fiscal
and administrative decentralization are both significantly associated with higher food security,
although not consistently in all models. The strongest predictor of food security in any model
(even compared to economic and geographic factors) was fiscal decentralization measured as a
factor score and deployed in a cross-sectional model. However, direct measures of fiscal and
administrative decentralization were not significant predictors of food security in time-series,
cross-sectional models. Finally, federalism is negatively associated with food security when
significant, but it is only significant in five out of the eleven models presented here. This chapter
reflects back on the dissertation and discusses how it contributes to the literature about social
welfare, democracy, decentralization, and federalism.
Democracy and Social Welfare
This dissertation contributes to the burgeoning literature on democracy and social
welfare. In that literature, the most consistent finding has been that democracy increases social
spending. This spending was assumed to enhance social welfare. Subsequent studies that
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examined social welfare outcomes called that assumption into question and found that
democracy’s effect on social welfare outcomes is inconsistent, but on balance, positive. However,
many studies that found positive effects were undercut by sample bias induced by listwise
deletion of high-performing autocratic regimes due to missing data (Ross 2006). Once sample
bias from this source was corrected using multiple imputation, democracy was found to have no
effect on infant or child mortality. Finally, most of the prior work on democracy and social welfare
used an operationalization of democracy that focused on political institutions and procedures.
This focus on procedural democracy is particularly troubling, since it seems to exclude much of
what is qualitatively democratic about democracy as a political system.
This dissertation adds a new perspective on the relationship between democracy and
social welfare in several respects. Firstly, I operationalized social welfare as food security, which
is a topic that has not been addressed in much detail in the quantitative political science
literature. Secondly, I used a measure of food security, the Food Security Index, that incorporates
measures on multiple dimensions of food security, rather than using a simpler proxy variable to
stand in for this complex topic. Thirdly, I employed quantitative measures of democracy that
capture two important dimensions of that concept: political rights and civil liberties. Political
rights comprise free and fair elections, universal suffrage, competitive parties, empowered
opposition parties, and freedom of participation. Civil liberties comprise freedom of speech, the
press, religion, freedom from discrimination, freedom to organize and assemble, property rights,
and rule of law (Freedom House 2014b). Finally, I used multiple imputation to correct for possible
sample bias due to patterns of missing data. My results remained significant and positive.
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The analysis presented here provides a nuanced view of the characteristics of democracy
that produce better social welfare. Political rights and civil liberties both matter for food security,
but they matter differently. Civil liberties are more strongly and more consistently associated
with increased food security than political rights. Civil liberties have an effect even when they are
only partially protected. That effect is enhanced by complete protections, but the largest increase
in food security associated with any of the democracy variables comes from a partial opening on
the civil liberties dimension. In addition, civil liberties are continuously effective. Every year that
civil liberties are protected produces better food security. Partial openings in political rights are
not effective – it is all or nothing along the political rights dimension. Political rights are also only
intermittently effective. In fact, political rights were only statistically significant with a four-year
lag between the political rights measurement and the year when food security was measured
(although the coefficient magnitudes were consistent across all lags). This suggests that political
rights may be affecting food security through a somewhat different mechanism than civil
liberties.
Future directions. I found that political rights and civil liberties both produce more food security,
but they do so in different ways. Therefore, there are different directions for future research for
each dimension. Civil liberties were effective at increasing food security even if the opening was
only partial. In fact, the movement from no civil liberties to partial protections was the most
effective. The civil liberties measure employed in this dissertation comes from Freedom House,
and it includes information about a series of different individual rights and freedoms, and the
rule of law. It would be useful to investigate if there is a specific subset of civil liberties that is
particularly effective in increasing food security. For example, Amartya Sen (1991; 1983) argues
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that freedom of the press is particularly important to ensure a free flow of information about the
state of social welfare, which can then serve to mobilize people to hold politicians accountable
and make government more responsive. He argued this in relation to famine, however, which is
the type of disaster that has the ingredients to hold the attention of the news media. What about
the case of chronic hunger of the type addressed in this project? Chronic hunger exists in the
background and is not often the focus of splashy media coverage. Employing different measures
that separate the concept of civil liberties into its constituent parts may be useful to see what
exactly is driving the effect that civil liberties have on food security.
Political rights are a different matter. Two pieces of information suggest that the
relationship of political rights to social welfare may be cyclical. Political rights give people the
ability to elect officials who will pay attention to food security. This power is centered on
elections, however. While elections themselves hold politicians accountable, and officials may
feel electoral pressure to address constituents’ needs, this effect may not be consistent and
continuous, especially if no election is imminent. Scholars who study political commitment to
hunger reduction have found that country experts in six countries all reported that expenditures
on hunger were sensitive to electoral cycles (te Lintelo et al. 2014). Viewed in that context, my
results may fit this cyclical interpretation. That is the subject of my recommendations for future
research into the effect of political rights on food security.
If food security is tied to electoral cycles, that effect ought to be measurable. One
possibility is to include a measure of whether or not a particular year was an election year in each
country. That would determine whether any increases in food security are specifically electionyear effects, while also providing a way to assess the magnitude of any effect. A second possibility
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is to include, for each year, how many years it has been since the last election. Presumably – if
the electoral cycle theory holds – as elections grow more distant, food security ought to decrease.
Finally, the Freedom House measures have been somewhat controversial, given that for
many years Freedom House was opaque with its methods for determining the scores. This has
largely been rectified – Freedom House now publishes documentation which describes the
panels of experts and the questionnaires that are used to score countries. I argue that the
Freedom House measures capture more information about the democratic nature of each
country than do measures like Polity IV. However, turning to even more nuanced measures of
democracy, such as those being developed by the Varieties of Democracy team (Coppedge 1999,
2002), may be useful for future research.
Decentralization and Social Welfare
This dissertation contributes to the literature on decentralization and social welfare by
providing a cross-national quantitative study of a subject that has often been viewed through the
lens of case studies. My results for decentralization and food security were mixed. In the crosssectional model using factor scores, both fiscal and administrative decentralization were
positively associated with food security. Fiscal decentralization, when measured as a factor score,
had a larger coefficient than any other variable in any of the models. In fact, an increase of only
about 16 percent in fiscal decentralization would be expected to produce the same magnitude
change in food security as moving from not free to completely free in terms of civil liberties.
Administrative decentralization, when measured as a factor score, also produces a positive effect
– substantively large, but smaller than that of fiscal decentralization. An increase of about 24
percent in administrative decentralization would be expected to produce the same magnitude
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change in food security as a complete opening in civil liberties. These results were not replicated,
however, in my time-series cross-sectional models that used direct measures of fiscal and
administrative decentralization. In those models, none of the measures of decentralization were
significantly related to food security. In addition, political decentralization, measured as a factor
score, was not associated with food security.
Future directions. This dissertation contributes to the quantitative empirical literature on
decentralization. However, the inconsistency of the results across my two types of models
indicates that further research is necessary before drawing any conclusions. Methodologically
speaking, the model with the significant results is the least robust, for two reasons. First, it is
based on a limited sample of 42 countries which are selected into the sample based on data
availability. Second, the dataset used for this model is cross-sectional. It is impossible to rule out
that there may be period-specific effects between 1996 and 2000 (when the independent
variables and the dependent variable were measured, respectively) that account for the
significant coefficients. More data collection is the answer here – ideally enough data would
become available so that more time slices of decentralization factor scores could be calculated
and used in a time-series, cross-sectional analysis. If the relationships shown in my cross-sectional
model continued to hold across different time periods, that would bolster the argument that
fiscal and administrative decentralization are positively associated with food security.
Finally, the political decentralization measure used herein may be problematic – it is
worth noting that these doubts are shared with the original architect of these measures
(Schneider 2003). The factor score for political decentralization was based on the presence of
local and subnational elections, without assessing the quality of the elections, local participation,
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candidates, or anything else. It would be a useful avenue of future research to gather more data
on measures that could capture the meaningfulness of local or subnational elections. If the
concept could be better measured, rather than lumping effectively and ineffectively
decentralized countries together into the same category, then I could be more certain in my
conclusions. As it stands, I would argue that the question of whether political decentralization
affects food security should remain open pending further investigation.
Federalism and Social Welfare
Federalism has been the subject of a great deal of debate. Many scholars have argued
that federalism can constrain spending of all types. Those who focus on redistribution theorize
that federalism makes redistribution more difficult. Of the eleven models presented in this
dissertation, five showed federalism to have a significant and substantive negative effect on food
security. This supports the theoretical contention that federalism makes redistribution (i.e. in this
case, spending on and implementation of social welfare programs like the ones that address food
insecurity) less likely.
Future directions. Future research in this area should focus on two things. First, other measures
of social welfare could be utilized. This project provides preliminary evidence that federalism
negatively affects food security. Does it have the same effect on other social welfare problems
whose solutions have a redistributive basis? In other words, if redistribution is a problem under
federalism, that ought to show up in cross-national studies of all kinds of social welfare measures.
Second, with careful selection, measures of social welfare could be used that would maximize
the available data. About a third of all federations did not appear in my democracy models, for
example, because the FSI was not measured for all of them. Specifically, the wealthy federations
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are excluded from my dataset. It would be helpful to choose a dependent variable that captures
social welfare, at the same time making sure that it was measured for the vast majority of
federations.
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I theorized that political rights and civil liberties – two dimensions of
democracy – would produce more food security. The results presented herein suggest that this
is true, and offer a more nuanced view. Food insecurity is almost by definition an affliction of the
least powerful in any society (Sen 1983). If democracy increases food security, it must do so, in
the simplest of terms, by putting the right people in office and subsequently pushing them to
adopt the right policies. The former is a function of an open and competitive system of elections
in which all candidates compete freely, and all societal groups can exercise their voting rights;
only in such a system do candidates who represent those with the least power have a chance of
getting into government. The latter is a function of keeping up political pressure to ensure
continuous attention to the problem of food insecurity. Political pressure of this type comes from
mobilized groups – mobilization which is only possible if civil liberties are effectively protected.
If this type of continuous pressure is absent, then attention to food insecurity is likely to vary
depending on electoral cycles. In short, political rights ensure responsiveness through electing
the right people, and civil liberties ensure responsiveness by providing the avenues to maintain
continuous pressure, to motivate politicians to respond even when no election is imminent.
While democracy produces higher food security, the magnitude is small compared with
that which may be produced by decentralization. Fiscal decentralization produces a
comparatively large increase in food security. Administrative decentralization produces a slightly
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lower magnitude of change, while still being substantively large. These results come from a model
estimated on limited data in a very specific time frame, however, so further investigation is
warranted before drawing firm conclusions. Federalism seems to provide an impediment to
increasing food security.
For a long time, scholars who study food security have focused on economic and
environmental explanations for the problem of food insecurity (Leathers and Foster 2004). This
dissertation shows that without a doubt, politics matter for food security. Absent careful
attention to the political determinants of food security, recommended solutions may be at best
incomplete and, at worst, ineffective. Political variables should be taken into account and studied
in our global effort to solve this important social welfare problem.
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APPENDIX A DATA DICTIONARY
Table A.1. Data Dictionary
Variable
Description
Food Security
prevUN
Prevalence of
undernourishment (%)

Coding

Source

3-year averages,
coded into middle
year

(IFPRI 2012)
UN FAO Food
Security Indicators
(IFPRI 2012)
UN FAO Food
Security Indicators
(IFPRI 2012)
World Bank

u5uw

Children under 5 who are
underweight (%)

u5mort

Mortality in children under 5

FSI

Food Security Index

1
= 1 − (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑈𝑁
3
+ 𝑢5𝑢𝑤 + 𝑢5𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡)

Democracy
CL_Free

Civil Liberties: Free

(Freedom House
2014a)

CL_PartF

Civil Liberties: Part Free

PR_Free

Political Rights: Free

PR_PartF

Political Rights: Part Free

if Freedom House Civil
Liberties Ranking =
[6,7], then 1, else 0
if Freedom House Civil
Liberties Ranking =
[3,4,5], then 1, else 0
if Freedom House
Political Rights
Ranking = [6,7], then
1, else 0
if Freedom House
Political Rights
Ranking = [3,4,5], then
1, else 0
Factor Score from
0 = centralized to
1 = decentralized
Factor Score from
0 = centralized to
1 = decentralized
Factor Score from
0 = centralized to
1 = decentralized
1 = Yes
0 = No

(Schneider 2003a)

Decentralization
adminDct
Administrative
Decentralization
fiscalDct

Fiscal Decentralization

polDct

Political Decentralization

federalism

Does the country have a
federal constitution?

(Freedom House
2014a)
(Freedom House
2014a)

(Freedom House
2014a)

(Schneider 2003a)

(Schneider 2003a)

CIA World Factbook
(Watts 2008)
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lclExp

Local Government
Expenditures as share of Total
Government Expenditures (%)
lclRev_TG
Local Government Revenues
as a share of Total
Government Revenues (%)
lclTax_Rev
Local Government Tax
Revenue as a share of Total
Local Government Revenue
(%)
lclCmpEmp Local Government
Compensation of Employees
as a share of Total
Government Compensation of
Employees (%)
SNExp
Subnational Government
Expenditures as a share of
Total Government
Expenditures (%)
SNRev_TG
Subnational Government
Revenues as a share of Total
Government Revenues (%)
SNTax_Rev Subnational Government Tax
Revenue as a share of Total
Subnational Government
Revenue (%)
SNCmpEmp Subnational Government
Compensation of Employees
as a share of Total
Government Compensation of
Employees (%)
Descriptive and Control Variables
ccode
Country code
country
Country name
subregion
Geographical Subregion

IMF Government
Finance Statistics
IMF Government
Finance Statistics
IMF Government
Finance Statistics

IMF Government
Finance Statistics

IMF Government
Finance Statistics

IMF Government
Finance Statistics
IMF Government
Finance Statistics

IMF Government
Finance Statistics

Unique identifier
1 = North Africa
2 = sub-Saharan Africa
3 = Caucasus and
Central Asia
4 = East Asia
5 = South Asia
6 = Southeast Asia
7 = West Asia (Middle
East)

United Nations
United Nations
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subSaharan
GDPperCap

Is the country in sub-Saharan
Africa?
Gross Domestic Product per
Capita

8 = Caribbean
9 = Latin America
10 = Oceania
11 = Europe
12 = North America
1 = Yes
0 = No
natural log

United Nations
World Bank
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APPENDIX B COUNTRIES INCLUDED BY MODEL
Table B.1. Countries Included in Democracy and Food Security Model
* indicates a federal country
Region
Country
Northern Africa
Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia*
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
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Nigeria*
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sudan* (former)
Swaziland
Togo
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Caucasus and Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Mongolia
South Asia
Bangladesh
India*
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Nepal*
Pakistan*
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Malaysia*
Philippines
Thailand
Timor Leste
Viet Nam
West Asia (Middle East)
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Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Republic
Turkey
Yemen
Caribbean
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Haiti
Jamaica
Trinidad and Tobago
Latin America
Argentina*
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Brazil*
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Mexico*
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela* (Bolivarian Republic of)
Oceania
Fiji
Europe
Albania
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina*
Bulgaria
Croatia
Estonia
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Latvia
Lithuania
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation*
Slovakia
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Ukraine

Table B.2. Countries Included in the Decentralization Factor Scores Model
* indicates a federal country
Region
Country
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana
Kenya
Mauritius
Senegal
South Africa
Zimbabwe
Caucasus and Central Asia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
East Asia
China
Mongolia
South Asia
India*
Southeast Asia
Indonesia
Malaysia*
Philippines
Thailand
Caribbean
Dominican Republic
Trinidad and Tobago
Latin America
Argentina*
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
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Brazil*
Chile
Guatemala
Mexico*
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Oceania
Fiji
Europe
Albania
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation*
Slovakia

Table B.3. Countries Included in the IMF Subnational Decentralization Model 1
* indicates a federal country
Region
Country
North Africa
Morocco
Tunisia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Congo
Lesotho
Mauritius
South Africa
Caucasus and Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
East Asia
China
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Mongolia
South Asia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Southeast Asia
Indonesia
Malaysia*
Thailand
West Asia (Middle East)
Jordan
Turkey
Caribbean
Jamaica
Latin America
Argentina*
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Brazil*
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Honduras
Europe
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina*
Bulgaria
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation*
Serbia
Slovakia
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Ukraine

Table B.4. Countries Included in the IMF Subnational Decentralization Model 2
* indicates a federal country
Region
Country
North Africa
Morocco
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Tunisia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Congo
Lesotho
Mauritius
South Africa
Caucasus and Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
East Asia
China
Mongolia
South Asia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Southeast Asia
Indonesia
Malaysia*
Thailand
West Asia (Middle East)
Jordan
Turkey
Caribbean
Jamaica
Latin America
Argentina*
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Brazil*
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Honduras
Mexico*
Europe
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina*
Bulgaria
Croatia
Estonia
Latvia
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Lithuania
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation*
Serbia
Slovakia
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Ukraine

Table B.5. Countries Included in the IMF Subnational Decentralization Model 3
* indicates a federal country
Region
Country
North Africa
Morocco
Tunisia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Congo
Lesotho
Mauritius
South Africa
Caucasus and Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
East Asia
Mongolia
South Asia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Southeast Asia
Indonesia
Thailand
West Asia (Middle East)
Jordan
Turkey
Caribbean
Jamaica
Latin America
Argentina*
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Brazil*
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Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Honduras
Europe
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina*
Bulgaria
Croatia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation*
Serbia
Slovakia
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Ukraine

Table B.6. Countries Included in the IMF Subnational Decentralization Model 4
* indicates a federal country
Region
Country
North Africa
Morocco
Tunisia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana
Congo
Ethiopia*
Kenya
Lesotho
Mauritius
Senegal
South Africa
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Caucasus and Central Asia
Armenia
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Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
East Asia
China
Mongolia
South Asia
India*
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Indonesia
Malaysia*
Philippines
Thailand
West Asia (Middle East)
Jordan
Turkey
Caribbean
Jamaica
Trinidad and Tobago
Latin America
Argentina*
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Brazil*
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico*
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Peru
Europe
Albania
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina*
Bulgaria
Croatia
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Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation*
Serbia
Slovakia
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Ukraine
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Food security is partially determined by politics. This dissertation examines three political
determinants of food security: democracy, decentralization, and federalism. Each one is
operationalized and tested quantitatively against food security using a dataset of all countries
from 1990 to 2011, although each model employs a different subset of the dataset. Democracy
is divided along two dimensions: political rights and civil liberties. Both are significant positive
predictors of food security. Increases in civil liberties are more consistently and strongly
associated with food security than increases in political rights.
Decentralization is assessed along three dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political.
Fiscal and administrative decentralization, when measured as factor scores, were significantly
associated with higher food security. In fact, the strongest predictor of food security in any model
(even compared to economic and geographic factors) was fiscal decentralization, when
measured as a factor score. However, direct measures of fiscal and administrative
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decentralization were not significantly associated with food security. Finally, federalism has a
consistently strong and negative effect when significant, but it is not significant in all models.
This dissertation contributes to the burgeoning literature on democracy and social
welfare, particularly because multiple imputation was used to correct for sample bias and the
effects remained significant and positive. In addition, it provides a nuanced view of the
characteristics of democracy that produce better social welfare. It contributes to the literature
on decentralization and social welfare, a subject often viewed through the lens of qualitative case
studies, by providing a cross-national quantitative study of the subject. Finally, it contributes to
the literature on federalism by testing theories about the difficulties of redistribution under
federalism. Avenues of future research are suggested.
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